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Thomas R. McLean* and Alexander B. McLean** 
Dependence on Cyberscribes — Issues in e-Security 
From the Book of Thomas & Alexander: God said “01010110101111”  
and there was e-security; and “Happy are the Cyberscribes  
for they shall inherit the control of e-documents.” 
Abstract 
A paucity of e-security exists in the world. The origins of this problem can be 
traced all the way back to Ancient Egypt, when literacy was held exclusively by a 
class of scribes. Although the Egyptians attempted to deter scribe corruption with 
harsh penalties, such corruption only ceased to be a problem when literacy became 
widespread in the Greek and Roman cultures. 
The modern lack of e-security, which is a cause of medical identity theft (MIT), 
can be traced to the fact that computer and computer code literacy is held 
exclusively by a class of “cyberscribes.” We, as a society, have attempted to deal with 
our illiteracy problem by enacting the HITECH Act, which contains harsh penalties 
for those individuals who gain unauthorized access to protected health information 
(PHI). So the question now becomes, will a strategy that failed in the 21st century 
B.C.E. work in the 21st century C.E.? 
To answer this question, this Article begins with an overview of computer 
systems and the tools available to corrupt cyberscribes to defeat e-security systems. 
The Article next examines the motivation for hackers to commit MIT. MIT is so 
financially lucrative that the penalties under HIPAA/HITECH create no real 
disincentives for hackers. Accordingly, the subsequent part of this Article reviews 
the HITECH Act, the Federal Wiretap Act, and the Stored Communications Act. 
Collectively, these laws can potentially create harsh penalties for anyone who gains 
unauthorized access to PHI. Unfortunately, loopholes in these laws mean that they 
are unlikely to deter corrupt cyberscribes from hacking medical records. Moreover, 
modification of these laws to make it clear that a conviction for hacking an 
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electronic medical record will result in a guaranteed ten-year prison sentence is still 
unlikely to deter hackers. The reason: the prosecution of hackers is difficult. 
So, if we seek a solution to cyberscribe corruption in our time, we need to study 
the Greek and Roman times when a change in societal conditions minimized the 
opportunity for corrupt scribes to game the system. In our modern times, changing 
our healthcare system to one of universal access would destroy the obscene profit 
associated with MIT and thereby destroy the biggest incentive available to hackers 
to breach e-security systems to gain unauthorized access to PHI. 
I. Introduction 
A general lack of e-security exists in today’s world, and this lack has real world 
consequences in the health care sphere.1 For example, in 2011 the Department of 
Health and Human Services (DHHS) fined Cignet Health $4.3 million for violating 
the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act’s (HIPAA) Privacy Rule,2 
and settled with the Massachusetts General Hospital for $1 million after the latter 
lost a number of patients’ personal electronic data.3 Interestingly, these two 
healthcare providers may have gotten off easy. Depending on how breach of e-
security damages are calculated,4 a healthcare provider’s average damages from an 
e-security breach have been reported to range from $5.5 million to $7.2 million in 
 1. This Article is being written for attorneys who have a minimal to a moderate understanding of 
computers and electronic devices. As used herein, “e-security” contemplates all human, hardware, and software 
techniques that secure transmitted or stored e-documents from unauthorized access.  
 2. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, Pub. L. No. 104–191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996); see 
News Release, HHS Imposes a $4.3 Million Civil Money Penalty for Violations of the HIPAA Privacy Rule, 
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. (Feb. 22, 2011), available at www.hhs.gov/news/press/ 
2011pres/02/20110222a.html. 
 3. See News Release, Massachusetts General Hospital Settles Potential HIPAA Violations, Dep’t of Health 
& Human Servs. (Feb. 24, 2011), available at www.hhs.gov/news/press/2011pres/02/20110224b.html. See 
generally Arthur E. Peabody, Jr. & Lucy L. Thompson, HITECH: The First Federal Data Breach Notification Law, 
in DATA BREACH AND ENCRYPTION HANDBOOK 128–29 (Lucy Thompson ed., 2011) [hereinafter DATA BREACH 
HANDBOOK] (describing the civil and criminal penalty allowances granted to DHHS under HIPAA); HIPAA 
Compliance and Data Protection, INTRONIS 1–2 (2011), http://www.intronis.com/resources/pdf/whitepapers/ 
HIPAA-compliance-WP.pdf (laying out the HIPAA requirements and recommending methods for 
compliance).  
 4. Total calculated damages depend on whether the data includes losses from administrative penalties, 
lawsuits, or damage to the business organization’s reputation. A detailed discussion on how damages arising 
from an e-security breach are calculated is beyond the scope of this Article. See PONEMON INST., 2011 COST OF 
DATA BREACH STUDY 3, 17 (Mar. 2012), available at http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/about/media/pdfs 
/b-ponemon-2011-cost-of-data-breach-us.en-us.pdf?om_ext_cid=biz_socmed_twitter_facebook_marketwire_ 
linkedin_2012Mar_worldwide__CODB_US (determining the cost of a data breach is based upon many 
different elements, including: the severity of the breach, legal costs, lost business, and industry); Arthur E. 
Peabody, Jr. & Renee A. Abbott, The Aftermath of Data Breaches: Potential Liability and Damages, in DATA 
BREACH HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 31–35 (describing growing financial risks of data breaches which 
businesses must prevent and the various ways data breaches have cost customer businesses).  
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recent years.5 At the extreme high end, e-security breaches may ultimately cost 
healthcare business entities billions of dollars in damages.6 As for patients, neither 
the rich nor the poor appear to be immune from e-security breaches that 
compromise personal health information.7 While e-security breaches can be 
secondary to provider’s negligence,8 increasingly e-security breaches are the planned 
works of malicious cyberscribes.9 For example, hackers gained control of 8.3 million 
medical records from the Commonwealth of Virginia's prescription drug database 
and then held these records for ransom.10 
Thus, we find ourselves with a modern version of an ancient problem. During 
the time of the Ancient Egyptian pharaohs, literacy was held exclusively by a class of 
scribes.11 These ancient scribes had a conflict of interest: from time to time, scribes 
gained personal advantages by corrupting written documents, a crime that was 
difficult to detect because only scribes were literate.12 The problem of corrupt 
 5. PONEMON INST., supra note 4, at 6, fig. 2 (determining the cost of data breaches from 2005 to 2011); cf. 
id. at 7, fig.4 (showing per capita cost of breaches across industries, of which healthcare is one of the highest). 
 6. See First-of-its-Kind Study Reveals the Reach and Severity of Medical Identity Theft in the United States, 
BUS. WIRE (Mar. 3, 2010, 2:00 PM), available at http://www.businesswire.com [hereinafter Medical Identity 
Theft Study] (estimating that medical identity theft costs healthcare businesses approximately $20,000 per 
victim, for a combined industry cost of $28.6 billion). In medical identity theft cases plaintiffs are required to 
prove that damages arise from actual harm incurred, and not the possibility of future harm. See Paul v. 
Providence Health Sys.-Or., 240 P.3d 110, 110–14 (Or. Ct. App. 2010), aff’d on other grounds, 273 P.3d 106 
(2012). 
 7. See Andrew Porter & James Kirkup, My Son’s Medical Records Were Hacked, Says Brown, DAILY 
TELEGRAPH (UK), July 12, 2011, at 1 (describing British Prime Minister Brown’s statement that his family 
medical records were hacked); see also Medical Identity Theft Study, supra note 6 (claiming almost 1.5 million 
Americans have had their medical identities stolen).  
 8. PONEMON INST., supra note 4, at 10 (describing that system breaches frequently occur after a mobile 
device storing this information is lost or stolen); see, e.g., Joseph De Avila, City News: Data are Stolen from 
Hospitals, WALL ST. J., Feb. 12, 2011, at A21 (describing the theft of 1.7 million medical data records from a New 
York City hospital that occurred when the magnetic data tapes were left in an unlocked car); see id. at 8 (stating 
that negligent employees are most often to blame for the cause of these breaches). 
 9. JEROME P. BJELOPERA & KRISTIN M. FINKLEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41547, ORGANIZED CRIME: AN 
EVOLVING CHALLENGE FOR U.S. LAW ENFORCEMENT 10 (2012); see Lucy L. Thompson, Cybercrime and Escalating 
Risks, in DATA BREACH HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 3–7 (identifying that the sophistication and scope of cyber-
attacks indicates criminal organizations are organizing these attacks); see also PETER SOMMER & IAN BROWN, 
FUTURE GLOBAL SHOCKS: REDUCING SYSTEMIC CYBERSECURITY RISK 30–31 (Jan. 14, 2011), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/sti/futures/globalprospects/46889922.pdf (explaining that “criminal gangs” are responsible 
for the growing criminal activity on the Internet). 
 10. Brian Krebs & Anita Kumar, Hackers Want Millions for Data on Prescriptions, WASH. POST, May 8, 
2009, at B1. 
 11. See generally JAMES GLEICK, THE INFORMATION: A HISTORY, A THEORY, A FLOOD 43 (2011) (stating that 
King Hammurabi “was probably the first literate king” of Mesopotamia).  
 12. See Life in Ancient Egypt, Daily Life: Scribes, CARNEGIE MUSEUM OF NATURAL HISTORY, 
http://www.carnegiemnh.org/online/egypt/scribes.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2012) (explaining that scribes 
created and controlled all the written documents in Ancient Egyptian Government); see also André Dollinger, 
Law and Order: The Criminals and their Crimes, RESHAFIM.ORG (Sept. 30, 2012, 8:32 PM), 
http://www.reshafim.org.il/ad/egypt/law_and_order/index.html (explaining that scribes acted as judges to read 
historical records, and often were susceptible for bribes or hesitant to punish other scribes); cf. Dan Ariely, Why 
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scribes was mitigated by ancient societies in two ways. First, harsh penalties (such as 
being buried alive) were given to any scribe caught keeping crooked books.13 The 
second solution to scribe corruption was a change in societal conditions.14 By the 
time the Greeks and Romans rose to power, literacy was widely disseminated.15 
Accordingly, during the Greek and Roman times the problem of the corrupt scribe 
faded away.16 Indeed, literacy had become so pervasive that the Romans found it 
necessary to encrypt documents to protect state secrets.17 
Yet, during the last generation of the 20th century C.E. the corrupt scribe 
problem was resurrected. During this period, the American society developed 
a dependence on computers.18 Few individuals in modern America (and other 
developed countries) understand the basic principles of how computers 
operate; and still fewer individuals can read computer code.19 Widespread 
computer use combined with computer code illiteracy means that our modern 
American society has become dependent on a class of cyberscribes20 who can read 
We Lie, WALL ST. J., May 26, 2016, at C1 (“[W]e want to benefit from cheating and get as much money and 
glory as possible; on the other hand, we want to view ourselves as honest, honorable people.”). 
 13. See Dollinger, supra note 12 (explaining the punishments for scribes caught for falsifying their writings 
were “savage”). Of course punishment of the crooked scribe must have raised evidentiary issues because an 
expert witness scribe — someone who was an economic competitor to the defendant scribe — would have been 
needed to provide testimony on the accuracy of the defendant’s writings. Cf. id. 
 14. See generally GLEICK, supra note 11, at 43 (describing that Hammurabi’s promotion of literacy 
throughout Mesopotamia government created “a new method of civil direction”). 
 15. WILLIAM V. HARRIS, ANCIENT LITERACY 9 (Harvard U. Press paperback ed. 1991) (“[R]eading and 
writing were learned by a great part of the population not only in Rome but in the whole Roman Empire.”). 
 16. See Albert C. Leighton, Secret Communication Among the Greeks and Romans, 10 TECH. & CULTURE 139, 
140–42 (1996) (describing how the dissemination of literacy in ancient Rome and Greece diminished the power 
of groups which formally had social power, which arose from the knowledge of the contents within the written 
articles). Additionally, for a brief period the monopoly on literacy reappeared in Europe around approximately 
1000 C.E. During this time, the only written language in Europe was Latin and only members of the Roman 
Catholic Church’s clergy understood written documents. See RUDI VOLTI, SOCIETY AND TECHNOLOGICAL 
CHANGE 214 (6th ed. 2009) (discussing the Liturgy’s withholding written sources of Latin text up to the 
fifteenth century in order to maintain power and control). 
 17. See Leighton, supra note 16, at 148 (stating that the Roman Government developed methods of 
document encryption, including the Caesar Cypher, “because of the increased sophistication of the literate 
public it was no longer possible to trust in the security of letters alone, new methods had to be developed to 
insure secrecy”). 
 18. See MISHA GLENNY, DARK MARKET: CYBERTHIEVES, CYBERCOPS AND YOU 1 (Alfred A. Knopf ed., 2011) 
(“[Humanity] ha[s] developed a dangerous level of dependency on networked systems in a short space of 
time.”). 
 19. See Dan L. Burk, Patenting Speech, 79 TEX. L. REV. 99, 106–07 (2000) (citing Karn v. United States 
Dep’t of State, 925 F.Supp. 1, 9 (D.D.C. 1996)) (noting that some courts accept the conclusion that “computer 
source code, even though incomprehensible to the majority of people, is comprehensible to other 
programmers”). 
 20. See Dan Greer, Jr., Cybersecurity and National Policy, 1 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 203, 203 (2010) (describing 
that currently e-security is the “province of the ‘The Few’” who understand the complex cyber code and 
describing the growing trend of “The Few” computer literate individuals who exploit the public’s unawareness 
of security and not taking efforts to protect it). 
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and write in machine code,21 produce programs22 or manipulate the esoteric 
multilayer Internet Protocol (IP).23 
In healthcare specifically, cyberscribe dependency is most clearly manifested in 
the lack of knowledge that patients and doctors have regarding the inner workings 
of Electronic Medical Record (EMR) systems24 and of the workings of computerized 
Electronic Medical Devices (cEMDs).25 The inner workings, especially with respect 
to e-security, of EMRs and cEMDs are so dependent on computer code that it 
would be a mistake not to realize that for all of our technology, we are still facing an 
ancient problem.26 Just as ancient scribes used literacy to gain personal advantages, 
it is reasonable to anticipate that modern cyberscribes will attempt to use their 
 21. Machine code is a string of zeros and ones that provides the ultimate instructions to a computer. Even 
for cyberscribes, working in machine code is difficult. See Klaus M. Schmidt & Monika Schnitzer, Public 
Subsidies for Open Source? Some Economic Policy Issues of the Software Market, 16 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 473, 475 
(2003) (“[M]achine code, which is just a sequence of zeros and ones. . . . [i]s very difficult to read for 
humans . . . and time-consuming to retranslate into source code.”); see also Paul I. Kravetz, Copyright Protection 
of Computer Programs, 80 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 41, 45 (1998) (describing the three levels of 
computer language, in ascending difficulty: high level, assembly language, and machine language); id. 
(“Programs written in assembly language are usually more difficult for programmers to understand than high 
level languages”). Low order computer language codes like assembly language produce very efficient code that 
can be easily transmitted, but these lower-order languages require the cyberscribe to keep track of a large 
number of details. See generally DOUGLAS GRAER, THE INTRINSIC HOLE IN INFORMATION SECURITY 2 (Aug. 15, 
2002), available at http://www.sans.org/reading_room/whitepapers/securecode/intrinsic-hole-information-
security_25 (distinguishing types of computer languages, specifically “C Language,” a midlevel language that 
does not require a high level of knowledge or skill and therefore “bridges the gap between hard to use assembly 
language and user friendly high level languages”). 
 22. Programs are written in computer languages. See Kravetz, supra note 21, at 46 (“Programs written in 
either high level or assembly languages are referred to as written in source code.”); cf. KEVIN MITNICK & 
WILLIAM L. SIMON, GHOST IN THE WIRES: MY ADVENTURES AS THE WORLD’S MOST WANTED HACKER 54 (2011) 
[hereinafter GHOST] (conveying a personal account of a hacker’s preference for lower-level coding). 
 23. Currently, Internet Protocol is used to transmit much of the data that passes through the Internet by 
joining “tens of thousands of networks to communicate via IP.” PATRICK CICCARELLI ET AL., NETWORKING 
BASICS 55 (2d ed. 2011). In the future, EMRs are likely to be electronically transmitted by the Nationwide 
Health Information Network’s Direct Project, which uses a variation of the Simple Mail Transport Protocol, the 
standard protocol for sending email messages over Internet Protocol. THE DIRECT PROJECT, THE DIRECT 
PROJECT OVERVIEW 9–11 (Oct. 11, 2010), available at http://directproject.org/content.php?key=overview.  
 24. An EMR contains the information that is available to healthcare providers and patients. Additionally, 
“[l]ike any other computer record” an EMR “generates metadata” which “is an automatically generated 
computer record that certifies how an electronic document (e-document) has been manipulated.” Thomas R. 
McLean, EMR Metadata: Uses and Discovery, 18 ANNALS HEALTH L. 75, 75 (2009). While a detailed discussion of 
metadata is beyond the scope of this Article, attorneys need to be aware that metadata is required for the formal 
authentication of an EMR. Id. at 86. 
 25. cEMDs refers to medical devices that use telemedicine or computer assisted devices that allow either 
physicians or surgeons to treat their patients. Thomas R. McLean, Cybersurgery—An Argument for Enterprise 
Liability, 23 J. LEGAL MED. 167, 168 (2002) (defining cEMDs and examining the legal issues these devices create, 
specifically liability, from emerging precedence). For the most part, these devices are beyond the scope of this 
Article. 
 26. See GLENNY, supra note 18, at 2 (describing the current social organization in which a “minuscule 
elite,” commonly referred to as hackers, “has a profound understanding of technology that everyday directs our 
lives more intensively and extensively, while most of the rest of us understand absolutely zip”); see also sources 
cited supra note 21. 
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computer code literacy to gain personal advantages. Indeed, the growing number of 
security breaches within the healthcare industry may indicate that the percentage 
(as well as the actual number) of EMR e-security breaches will continue to increase 
in the next few years as techniques are developed to decrease the incidence of e-
security breaches arising from negligence.27 
So how will the United States solve the ancient problem of the corrupt 
cyberscribe? Will it be by severe punishment or by a change in societal conditions? 
To answer this question, this Article examines the economic and legal incentives 
given to hackers. However, given the ubiquitous nature of computers and the 
Internet in our private and commercial lives, the scope of this Article will have 
relevance to more than those individuals working in the healthcare field: any 
attorney who handles confidential e-documents should find the discussion herein 
of e-security interesting.28 Part II of this Article provides an overview of the 
“physics” of e-security (i.e., the nature of computer systems, malware, and 
encryption).29 Part III examines the economic factors that seem destined to 
substantially increase the incidence of unauthorized access to EMRs and cEMDs, 
and drive medical identity theft.30 Part IV then examines the laws governing e-
security to determine whether such laws are likely to deter corrupt cyberscribes.31 
This Article reaches two conclusions. First, as we move towards a healthcare 
system based on the ubiquitous presence of EMRs, corrupt cyberscribe activity will 
increase because the existing laws create, at best, a mild deterrence to such activity.32 
Second, if we are truly interested in making EMRs secure, we need to change 
societal conditions that allow hackers to flourish.33 In the case of healthcare, moving 
to a healthcare system that has universal access would minimize hacking because 
universal access is likely to destroy the black market value of personal health 
information.34 
 
 27. PONEMON INST., supra note 4, at 21 (demonstrating that in 2011 the healthcare industry comprised 
10% of the total security breaches across all industries); see also Lucy L. Thomson, Despite the Alarming Trends, 
Data Breaches Are Preventable, in DATA BREACH HANDBOOK, supra note 3, 20–21 (stating the number of stolen 
EMRs has increased from 2,741,101 in 2006 to 10,461,818 in 2009 due to “both the vast amount of personal 
data housed at hospitals and medical centers and the comparatively lax security employed by these 
organizations”). 
 28. This Article contains material relevant to all attorneys, even those whose only electronic device is a 
smartphone. See Lucy L. Thompson, Cybercrime and Escalating Risks, in DATA BREACH HANDBOOK, supra note 
3, at 10–11 (describing the rising trend of criminals hacking into law firm networks in order to steal confidential 
information about the firm’s clients). Additionally, “e-message,” “e-communication,” and “e-document” are 
used frequently in this Article in an interchangeable manner. 
 29. See infra Part II. 
 30. See infra Part III. 
 31. See infra Part IV. 
 32. See infra Parts IV.B–C. 
 33. See infra Part V. 
 34. See infra Part V. 
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II. E-Security Overview: Systems, Malware, and Encryption 
EMRs, like e-data and money, must be kept safe from loss, corruption, and 
unauthorized access.35 For EMRs and cEMDs, the risk of an e-security breach 
depends on a number of factors, including the nature of the computer system, the 
presence of malware, the use of encryption and the social sophistication of the 
hacker.36 This section will review the first three of these factors, while the social 
sophistication of hackers (which may be revealed through, for example, social 
engineering) will be addressed in Part III of this Article.37 
A. Computer Systems 
Three basic types of computer systems exist: closed, semi-closed, and open with 
other computer systems.38 With a closed system, also known as a client-server (CS) 
system, the system’s purchaser is the owner-operator of the system.39 A CS system is 
considered closed to the outside world because the owner-operator controls all 
aspects of the system, including the system’s hardware (i.e., the server and its 
terminals), software (including the e-security package40), and authorized access to 
the system.41 With respect to EMRs, the principal advantage of the CS system is its 
security; of the three types of computer systems, closed systems are considered to be 
 35. Cf. Peabody & Thomson, HITECH: The First Federal Data Breach Notification Law, in DATA BREACH 
HANDBOOK, supra note 3, 128–29 (describing HIPAA’s increased authority to impose penalties, both civil and 
criminal, upon an individual or business after a security breach results in the loss, corruption, or destruction of 
EMRs). 
 36. See infra Parts II.B–C, III; see also DAVID SALOMON, ELEMENTS OF COMPUTER SECURITY 2 (2010) 
(describing the numerous ways a hacker may breach a computer network’s security, but concluding that “[a]n 
attacker has to find only one security weakness to compromise an entire [network]”).  
 37. See infra Part III. 
 38. “Closed,” “semi-closed,” and “open” are descriptive terms, used here to explain whether a computer 
system interacts with other computer systems. 
 39. See Anita Jones, Cyber Security in Open Systems, COMPUTER SYSTEMS: THEORY, TECHNOLOGY, AND 
APPLICATIONS 133, 133–34 (Andrew Herbert & Karen Spärck Jones eds., 2004) (describing a closed computer 
system as a system in which each computer acts alone, and this single access reduces the need for 
comprehensive e-security); see also Steven Biggs & Stilianos Vidalis, Cloud Computing Storms, 1 INT’L J. 
INTELLIGENT COMPUTING RES. 3, 62 (describing the traditional, “closed,” computing system in which the user 
has sole ownership of both the computing hardware and software). 
 40. As used here, an e-security package is to be viewed broadly to mean all aspects of a computer system’s 
security that is controlled by digital code. Such security features would include, but are not limited to, the 
computer’s firewall, the anti-virus protection, the type of encryption, and the nature of password protection. 
 41. See Biggs & Vidalis, supra note 39, at 62 (comparing CS systems to newer “cloud computing”). 
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the most secure.42 This is not to say that the security associated with a CS system is 
infallible, as all computer systems are vulnerable to e-security breaches.43 
At the other extreme of computer systems are open systems, including the 
systems commonly known as cloud computing systems.44 Compared with the closed 
system, cloud systems have the reverse trade-off, in that open systems are often 
cheaper to operate, but they are less secure.45 Open systems are less expensive 
because their software programs are run over the Internet rather than on a 
dedicated local computer,46 thereby lowering the per user software costs.47 These 
differences allow vendors of cloud-based computer systems to sell their services 
according to a flat monthly subscription fee.48 EMR subscription fees for cloud 
services might range from $175 per month49 to $600 per month.50 
 42. See Jones, supra note 39, at 133 (“Cyber security has been a casualty of the transition from closed to 
open systems. In closed systems sufficient protection of one user from another could be assured . . . .”). But see 
Jonathan Loiterman, Free as in Freedom: Open Source Software’s Role in Remaking Healthcare in the Twenty-First 
Century, 19 ANNALS HEALTH L. 259, 259–60 (explaining that “[c]losed, proprietary information systems and 
closed software licensing are a big problem in the healthcare industry” because these systems remove a doctor’s 
ability to alter, update, or view a patient’s EMR). 
 43. Benjamin G. Walker, Protection of Data Privacy in Computer Systems, 21 ISR. L. REV. 1, 9 (1986) (“There 
is no perfectly secure computer system.”); cf. David Kushner, Machine Politics: the Man who Started the Hacker 
Wars, NEW YORKER, May 7, 2012, available at http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2012/05/07/120507fa_ 
fact_kushner?printable=true (describing a hacker’s successful attempt to hack Sony’s “impenetrable” system, 
after which the hacker stated “nothing is unhackable”). 
 44. See Jared A. Harshbarger, Cloud Computing Providers and Data Security Law: Building Trust with 
United States Companies, 16 J. TECH L. & POL’Y 231, 232 (2011) (comparing the extreme differences from closed 
to open systems by explaining that open systems perform “computing practices on an outside vendor’s 
machines somewhere in the cloud”). Other types of open computer systems are web-based servers or 
Application Service Provider (ASP) systems. See CICCARELLI, supra note 23, at 28 (describing ASPs as systems 
that provide access to specific software to be stored on the system). 
 45. See Lucy L. Thompson, Cybercrime and Escalating Risks, in DATA BREACH HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 
12 (demonstrating that the open nature of cloud systems reduces computing costs, but multiple security risks 
arise from the open nature of the programs as well as from third party operators’ access to the data). See 
generally Harshbarger, supra note 44, at 233–37 (explaining the various advantages and disadvantages of cloud 
computing). 
 46. See Harshbarger, supra note 44, at 232–33 (explaining the specific features of cloud computing not 
permitted in closed systems that make cloud computing economical). 
 47. See id. at 232 (stating cloud computing reduces costs because “user transitions from operating on their 
own mainframe to operating on an Internet-based architecture in the ‘cloud’”). See generally Lucy L. 
Thompson, Cybercrime and Escalating Risks, in DATA BREACH HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 12–13 (describing the 
cost efficiency of shared computing services). 
 48. See Jack Newton, Solo/Small Firm: Ten Reasons to Adopt Cloud Computing for Your Law Office, 74 TEX. 
BAR J. 860, 861 (2011) (stating “[m]ost cloud computing solutions offer a simple month-to-month 
subscription” and because the user is not purchasing additional hardware the customer doesn’t incur “upfront 
hardware purchases”). But see Sean Mortson et al., Cloud Computing: The Business Perspective 23 (Working 
Paper), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1413545 (“There are many different 
potential pricing policies available to providers, such as flat fee, pay-per-use fee, or a two-tier mix of flat and 
pay-per-usage fee.”). 
 49. See, e.g., ENCOUNTERWORKS, EncounterWorks Patient Management / EMR Cloud Quote (Oct. 5, 2012), 
http://encounterworks.com/docs/brocures/cloud-emr-price-comparrison.pdf. 
 Thomas R. McLean & Alexander B. McLean 
Vol. 8, No. 1 2013 67 
In exchange for lower operating costs, cloud computing services often provide 
weaker e-security for several reasons.51 First, e-documents in a cloud system are only 
as secure as the cloud-EMR vendor’s e-security policy for that subscription rate.52 
Second, even if a client is willing to pay a cloud vendor a premium price for better 
e-security, it may be impossible to make a cloud system as safe as a CS system.53 
Cloud-based systems are subject to attacks that are mediated by malware that 
exploit “holes” in the Internet and the open system’s software.54 Finally, “[c]loud 
service providers typically work with numbers of third parties,” so cloud users need 
to consider these third-parties as e-security risks.55 
While this difference in security may sound subtle, the difference has real world 
implications. To illustrate, consider the recent attack on an Indiana hospital in 
which the hackers targeted the hospital’s cloud-based computer system that 
 50. See Marianne Kolbasuk McGee, Is that a Cloud on Healthcare’s Horizon?, INFORMATIONWEEK (June 16, 
2009), http://www.informationweek.com/cloud-computing/is-that-a-cloud-on-healthcares-horizon/229206257 
(reporting that eClinicalWorks brand software may have a monthly subscription fee as high as $600). 
 51. See generally William Jeffery Robinson, Free at What Cost?: Cloud Computing Privacy Under the Stored 
Communications Act, 98 GEO. L.J. 1195, 1214–17 (2010) (describing the impact of the terms of service 
agreements within service contracts and the power the service provider may receive to access the customer’s 
data based on the level of service agreed upon in the subscription). In addition to suboptimal security, cloud 
computing also suffers from a lack of oversight by regulators and a lack of interoperability with existing 
applications. See Harshbarger, supra note 44, at 235–36 (explaining a disadvantage of cloud computing includes 
the potential that the cloud provider may not comply with cyber security regulations and there may be 
increased vulnerabilities). 
 52. See Simon Bradshaw et al., Contracts for Clouds: Comparison and Analysis of the Terms & Conditions of 
Cloud Computing Services 21–34 (Queen Mary Sch. of L. Legal Stud. Res. Paper No. 63/2010, 2010), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1662374 (analyzing the terms and conditions in numerous cloud providers’ service 
agreements and determining that cloud providers supply minimal security under standard service agreements); 
see also WAYNE JANSEN & TIMOTHY GRANCE, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., U.S. DEP’T COMMERCE, PUB. 
NO. 800-144, GUIDELINES ON SECURITY AND PRIVACY IN PUBLIC CLOUD COMPUTING 40–43 (2011), available at 
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-144/SP800-144.pdf (stating that customers should subscribe to 
cloud providers that use negotiable service agreements which provide the customer with the ability to negotiate 
the terms of the service to emphasize security). Thus, it is a wise decision to review the service agreement and 
select the provider that offers additional data protection measures. See generally Mayer Brown LLP, Managing 
the Risks of Cloud Computing, reprinted in MONDAQ BUS. BRIEFING, Dec. 10, 2010 (advising a potential cloud 
subscriber that one of the essential tasks before subscribing to a cloud service is to establish clear terms in the 
service contract for liability on breaches and general security). 
 53. See Jones, supra note 39, at 134 (explaining that hackers normally breach open systems through “holes” 
that must be patched in order to make the software more secure). See generally Michael J.G. van Eeten & 
Johannes M. Bauer, Economics of Malware: Security Decisions, Incentives and Externalities (Org. for Econ. Co-
Operation & Dev., Working Paper No. 2008/1, 2008) (describing that before third party vendors patch a hole 
they balance the cost to patch the hole against the ongoing vulnerability to hackers this open hole provides). 
 54. See supra note 53. 
 55. Manisha Malhorta, “EIGAMAL Signature Scheme” - Approach to Ensuring the Security of Cloud 
Computing Environment, INT’L J. ENTER. COMPUTING & BUS. SYS. (2010), www.ijecbs.com/ 
January2012/7.pdf; see also Lucy L. Thompson, Cybercrime and Escalating Risks, in DATA BREACH HANDBOOK, 
supra note 3, at 12 (stating the increased risks of cloud computing that arise from users relying on “third-party 
service providers to process or analyze [the users’] confidential information”). 
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contained employee health data.56 This e-security breach resulted in the hackers 
obtaining personal information, including Social Security numbers, of more than 
12,000 people who applied for jobs at the hospital.57 Yet, the same hacker attack left 
the hospital’s records that were stored in the hospital’s more secure closed EMR 
system untouched.58 Given the street value of patients’ health and insurance data, it 
is plausible that hackers went after the hospital’s employees’ records because the 
cloud-based record system was less secure than the CS-based patient record 
system.59 
Increasingly, smartphones employ cloud computing systems.60 Given that there 
are a number of medical application programs for smartphones,61 physicians62 and 
patients63 are increasingly using smartphones as cEMD.64 Yet, as the World News 
smartphone hacking scandal has demonstrated, hackers have identified a number of 
ways to breach the e-security of smartphones.65 Although the details of just how 
hackers were able to compromise the smartphones of the United Kingdom’s Royal 
 56. See IU Health Goshen Data Hit by Virus, S. BEND TRIB., Feb. 1, 2012, at C1 (describing a computer 
virus, planted by hackers, that successfully breached an Indiana Hospital’s cloud computing system and 
attempted to steal the hospital records on this system). 
 57. Id.; IU Health Goshen Suffers Web Security Breach; Personal Information of More than 12,000 People 
Compromised, GOSHEN NEWS (Jan. 31, 2012), http://goshennews.com/local/x647581516/IU-Health-Goshen-
suffers-web-security-breach-personal-information-for-more-than-12-000-people-compromised (describing a 
breach that gave hackers access to the personal information for more than 12,000 people who applied for jobs at 
the hospital). 
 58. See IU Health Goshen Data Hit by Virus, supra note 56. 
 59. See infra Part III. 
 60. See Mikael Ricknäs, HTC Launches Entry-Level Android Smartphone with Dropbox, COMPUTERWORLD 
(Aug. 30, 2012), http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9230762/HTC_launches_entry_level_Android_ 
smartphone_with_Drobox (“Smartphone integration with cloud storage is starting to become common 
place.”). See generally Lucy L. Thompson, Cybercrime and Escalating Risks, DATA BREACH HANDBOOK, supra 
note 3, at 13 (describing that the increase in mobile device use presents a major vulnerability, specifically for the 
theft of personal identities, such that experts predict that hacking mobile devices will be a major criminal 
activity). 
 61. See Dina ElBoghdady, Feeling Sick? There’s an App for that, WASH. POST, June 24, 2012, at G01 
(describing that more than 13,000 mobile medical applications are available and “medical applications have 
flooded onto millions of smartphones”). 
 62. Olga Khazan, Summit: Medical Devices Going Mobile, WASH. POST, Dec. 12, 2011, at A31 (describing 
the recent innovations of mobile applications specifically created to enable doctors to monitor their patients 
over mobile devices). 
 63. Steven Overly, Mobile Health Apps Navigate Privacy, Safety Concerns, WASH. POST, Apr. 30, 2012, at A8. 
 64. See David Daw, FDA Plans to Regulate Smartphone Apps., PCWORLD (July 19, 2011, 1:30 PM), 
www.pcworld.com/. . ./fda_plans_to_regulate_smartphone_apps.html (reporting an increase in the use of 
medical smartphone “app” programs in recent years). 
 65. See, e.g., Timeline of Britain’s Phone-Hacking Scandal, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, July 20, 2011, 
http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/europe/timeline-of-britains-phone-hacking-scandal; see Katherine 
Rushton, Murdoch Stepping Down Doesn’t Mean Clear Skies for Sky, DAILY TELEGRAPH (UK), Apr. 4, 2012, at B4; 
see also LORI ANDREWS, I KNOW WHO YOU ARE AND I SAW WHAT YOU DID (2012) (discussing the overall loss of 
privacy that users experience as a result of the use of social networks). 
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Family (and others) have not officially been released, it seems likely that the 
smartphones of the Royals were the victims of a malware attack.66 
B. Malware 
Regardless of which type of computer system a hacker seeks to compromise, among 
the favorite tools of hackers for gaining unauthorized access to the targeted 
computer system are malware and social engineering.67 Malware is classically 
defined as “a computer program designed specifically to damage or disrupt a 
system, such as a virus.”68 When hackers write malware programs, a higher-order 
computer language is generally used. Higher-order computer languages are more 
elaborate then the zeros and ones of machine code as they have word-like 
commands and use syntax.69 Unless you are both trained and experienced in higher-
order computer languages, these languages can be as foreign as Latin or Chinese to 
a native English speaker.70 
  
 66. See Andy Bloxham, Prince and Duchess Warned of Phone Hacking, DAILY TELEGRAPH (UK), July 15, 
2012, at 5 (noting that there are at least 10 members of the Royal Family whose mobile phones might have been 
hacked); see also 45 C.F.R. § 164.304 (2011) (defining “malicious software,” also known as “malware”); Robert 
W. Ludwig, Jr., Salvatore Scanio & Joseph S. Szary, Malware and Fraudulent Electronic Fund Transfers, XVI 
FIDELITY L. J. 101, 103–04 (2010). 
 67. See Sean B. Hoar, Trends in Cybercrime: The Dark Side of the Internet, 20 CRIM. JUST. 4, 4–5 (2005) 
(describing social engineering and malware as “two common methods used to commit cybercrime”). 
 68. Malware, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 753 (11th ed. 2008). 
 69. See supra note 19. 
 70. See, e.g., infra Table I. 
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int array[100], n, c; 
printf(“Enter the number of elements in array\n”); 
scanf(“%d”, &n); 
printf(“Enter %d elements\n”, n); 
for ( c = 0 ; c < n ; c++ ) 
scanf(“%d”, &array[c]); 
printf(“Array elements entered by you are:\n”); 
for ( c = 0 ; c < n ; c++ ) 
printf(“array[%d] = %d\n”, c, array[c]); 
return 0; 
} 
Still, it is not typically possible to classify malware based on its intended use. The 
same computer code that can have legitimate beneficial use can sometimes also be 
used to achieve a malevolent or destructive goal.72 Accordingly, herein, we define 
malware broadly to include any computer program that can be used to compromise 
e-security, regardless of whether that computer program may also have a legitimate 
use or a beneficial intent.73 
1. First Generation Malware 
Viruses, Trojan horses, and worms are paradigmatic forms of first generation 
malware. A computer virus is a program or piece of code that is capable of self-
replication and may perform tasks on a computer system without the operator’s 
knowledge or consent. Viruses almost always require the victim to open a file in 
order to cause damage.74 Trojan horses are typically passed through downloads 
 71. C Program Examples, PROGRAMMING SIMPLIFIED, http://www.programmingsimplified.com/c-program-
examples (last visited Oct. 13, 2012). 
 72. See ANDREWS, supra note 65, at 73; see also Peter Beaumont, Stuxnet Worm Heralds New Era of Global 
Cyberwar, GUARDIAN (UK), Sept. 30, 2010, available at 2010 WLNR 19416018. 
 73. A computer code is ultimately nothing more than a string of zeros and ones, accordingly, computer 
code is incapable of the mental process required to create intent. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 881 (9th ed. 
2009) (defining “intent” as “the state of mind accompanying an act, especially a forbidden act”). 
 74. See Michael Edmund O’Neil, Old Crimes in New Bottles: Sanctioning Cybercrime, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 
237, 247 (2000) (noting that a virus commonly requires some sort of action on the user’s part before it can be 
activated such as the opening of a file). 
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disguised as legitimate files, while viruses are more often passed by email.75 The 
main difference is that Trojans, unlike viruses, neither infect other files nor self-
replicate; they typically create backdoors into users’ systems.76 Worms are similar to 
both viruses and Trojan horses with the key distinction that worms can spread 
without human action and they self-replicate.77 Regardless of whether a hacker uses 
a virus, a Trojan horse, a worm, or some other malware, the goal of the hacker is 
usually to render the targeted computer system inoperable, to hijack a computer, or 
to spy on a computer.78 In short, the characteristic feature of first generation 
malware was destruction and defacement. 
2. Current Generation Malware 
Current generation malware and hackers, by way of contrast, often have broader 
objectives than rendering a computer system inoperable or causing harm per se. 
Rather, current generation malware often concerns itself with the hijacking of, or 
the spying on, a targeted computer(s).79 To hijack a computer, a hacker may use 
malware that takes control of a computer such that control of the device is 
transferred to a remote computer.80 For example, the Mariposa botnet hijacked 12.7 
million computers to facilitate the theft of login and password information from 
financial institutions.81 Alternatively, botnet attacks may be launched to take down a 
financial services’ or an economic competitor’s server.82 Hackers could potentially 
also use current generation malware programs for spying (also known as spyware)83 
to gain unauthorized access to protected health information (PHI).84 As Professor 
 75. See GLENNY, supra note 18, at 122 (“Zip files were some of the most notorious carriers of trojan 
infections.”). 
 76. See Benjamin R. Jones, Comment, Virtual Neighborhood Watch: Open Source Software and Community 
Policing Against Cybercrime, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 601, 608 (2007) (explaining that Trojan horse 
programs contain “backdoor” functions that allow remote access to the computer). 
 77. See O’Neil, supra note 74, at 247 (worm replicates itself and relies solely upon computer networks to 
duplicate itself, thus it is not dependent on a user’s action for transmission); see also Sharon D. Nelson & John 
W. Simek, Electronic Security in Your Law Office, 38 TENN. B.J. 12, 13 (2002) (“A worm is a program or 
algorithm that replicates itself over a computer network and usually performs malicious actions.”). 
 78. Cf. Susan W. Brenner, Nanocrime?, 2011 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 39, 58, 78 (2011) (noting that 
malware can be used to siphon valuable information from a victim computer system). 
 79. See Kaspersky Lab Zao, Patent Issued for System and Method for Dynamically Allocating Computing 
Resources for Processing Security Information, INFO. TECH. NEWSWEEKLY, July 17, 2012, at 2 (discussing 
cybercriminals and the current generation of malware).  
 80. See Mark Bassingthwaighte, Esq., Ten Technology Traps and How to Avoid Them, W. VA. LAW. 34, 39 
(Oct. 2006) (noting that other types of malware programs enable a remote computer to monitor your machine 
or scan your computer network). 
 81. Summary Box: 3 Nabbed for Huge Computer Infection, ASSOCIATED PRESS FIN. WIRE, Mar. 2, 2010. 
 82. Report: ‘Kneber’ Botnet Attacked 75,000 Systems, SAN JOSE BUS. J., Feb. 18, 2010, at 1. 
 83. See FinFisher Surveillance Malware Spreads to Smart Phones, TORONTO STAR, Aug. 30, 2012, at B1. 
 84. See Mike Paquette, An Ounce of Prevention for the Healthcare IT Network, HEALTH MGMT. TECH., Dec. 
2006, at 18 (defining spyware as a type of “malicious content”). 
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Andrews has recently and comprehensively reviewed spyware programs, no attempt 
will be made here to replicate her work.85 
A hacker can attack computer systems using either a front door or backdoor 
strategy. During a front door attack on a computer system, the hacker gains 
unauthorized access to a computer system by using a pirated password or other 
login information in the same way a legitimate user would use this information to 
access the computer system.86 Pirated authentication can be obtained directly or 
indirectly through the use of malware.87 In a direct attack, the hacker connects 
directly to the compromised computer.88 For example, a hacker may use a Trojan to 
install a keystroke logger program to obtain login authentication information.89 
Another example is when a hacker sends a virus to a user via a phishing email and 
the virus opens the computer to the hacker once the user opens the email.90 In an 
indirect attack, the hacker uses third party computers to conduct an attack.91 
Understanding how a hacker attacks a computer system through the backdoor is 
more complicated, but basically this strategy takes advantages of vulnerabilities in 
the software.92 Therefore, for simplicity’s sake, herein, unless otherwise indicated, a 
“backdoor” refers only to holes in the source code of legitimate software regardless 
of whether the backdoor was intentionally left by the original programmer for 
debugging or subsequently inserted by a hacker via software vulnerabilities in order 
to facilitate subsequent unauthorized entry.93 
 85. LORI ANDREWS, I KNOW WHO YOU ARE AND I SAW WHAT YOU DID (2012).  
 86. See This Winter, Protect Computers from Viruses Too, U.S. ST. NEWS, Dec. 12, 2005, available at 2005 
WLNR 20005955 (describing tools that can be used to prevent front- and back-door attacks). 
 87. See B3: Authentication, Authorization, and Encryption Systems, PRACTICAL IT AUDITING (Warren 
Gorham & Lamont eds., 2012), available at 2003 WL 21375197. Direct attacks set up a direct link from the 
hacker to the compromised machine. Id. Indirect attacks use third party computers to conduct an attack. Id. 
However, sophisticated hackers commonly use indirect approaches. See, e.g., Nicole Perlroth, Hackers in China 
Attacked The Times for Last 4 Months, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2013, at A1 ("The hackers tried to cloak the source of 
the attacks on The Times by first penetrating computers at United States universities and routing the attacks 
through them, said computer security experts at Mandiant, the company hired by The Times.") 
 88. See supra note 87. 
 89. See Jonathan Sidener, LOG-ON LARCENY: Keystroke Loggers Can Steal Sensitive Data, Commit Fraud, 
SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Oct. 25, 2004, at E1 (discussing that keystroke logger software logs the strokes typed 
on computer keyboards so that others can remotely read and steal personal information). 
 90. See Jeremy Feigelson & Camille Calman, Liability for the Costs of Phishing and Information Theft, 13 J. 
INTERNET L. 15, 16 (2010) (describing the concept of email phishing). 
 91. See Newest Digital Tech Aids Hackers, CAP. TIMES (Madison, Wis.), Feb. 28, 2000, at 5A (“Indirect 
hacking can occur through e-mail . . . . [so t]o discourage hacking, [it is advisable] to turn off file- and print-
sharing options in Windows-based systems.”). 
 92. See New Linux Trojan Horse, INFO. SYS. AUDITOR (Int’l Newsl.), Mar. 1, 2002, at 5 (describing a 
“backdoor” Trojan software attack). 
 93. See GHOST, supra note 22, at 31 (explaining a system “backdoor” as “software code that sets [a hacker] 
up so [he would] be able to gain access whenever [he] want[s] to get back in”).  
 Thomas R. McLean & Alexander B. McLean 
Vol. 8, No. 1 2013 73 
While this review of computer hacking 101 lacks the detail to train a true 
malicious cyberscribe,94 for many readers this review provides insight into a level of 
stealth that they could not have previously imagined. Just as the scribes of Ancient 
Egypt could commit crimes that were almost inconceivable to the illiterate masses,95 
today’s cyberscribes, who are fluent in computer languages and e-security 
architecture, can commit crimes that are almost inconceivable to the computer 
illiterate 21st century man. Worse, hacker stealth is reaching even new heights in the 
era of designer, so-called “zero day” malware.96 
3. Next Generation Malware 
The computer virus Stuxnet is the prototype of next generation designer malware.97 
Designer malware like Stuxnet is highly discriminating with respect to the computer 
it impacts: while it may still be able to spread from computer to computer, the 
manifestations of the malware will only become apparent when the malware 
encounters a specific type of computer (or electronic device).98 
Stuxnet, which the United States military almost certainly had a hand in 
developing,99 was designed to seek out and disable a specific brand of control system 
located in an Iranian nuclear facility.100 On any other computer or device, Stuxnet 
has no effect.101 Stuxnet was wildly successful as it substantially impaired Iran’s 
 94. Indeed, any reader who thinks that based on this primer on computer language and technology that 
they can breach a computer’s e-security system has not read the majority of the footnotes. Cf. Eric Talbot 
Jensen, Cyber Warfare and Precautions Against the Effects of Attacks, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1401, 1539 (2010) (noting 
that the Department of Defense ordered all troops and officials involved in protecting computer networks to 
undergo training in computer hacking under the premise that “to beat a hacker, you must think like one”). 
 95. If the Ancient Egyptians could imagine the power of the scribes to steal from the contents of the 
pharaohs’ warehouse, it is likely that literacy in general population would have appeared long before the Greeks 
in the fifth century B.C.E. See generally supra notes 11–17 and accompanying text. 
 96. See Sharon D. Nelson, Esq. & John W. Simek, Preventing Law Firm Data Breaches, 75 TEX. B.J. 364 
(2011) (describing a “zero day exploit” as an instance in which the user “got the mal-ware [sic] before the 
security companies have had a chance to muster a defense against it”). 
 97. See Richard Brust, CYBERATTACKS: Computer Warfare Looms as the Next Big Conflict in International 
Law, 98 A.B.A. J. 40, 41 (2012) (noting that the future is likely to see more viruses like Stuxnet, which represents 
the so-called high end of cyberware”); see also Stuxnet: Computer Worm Opens New Era of Warfare, CBS NEWS 
(July 1, 2012, 7:03 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-18560_162-57460009/stuxnet-computer-worm-opens-
new-era-of-warfare/ (noting that Stuxnet is unlike the millions of worms and viruses that turn up on the 
Internet each year). 
 98. See Stuxnet: Computer Worm Opens New Era of Warfare, CBS NEWS (July 1, 2012, 7:03 PM), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-18560_162-57460009/stuxnet-computer-worm-opens-new-era-of-warfare/ 
(explaining that Stuxnet was designed to only hit one target and it goes through a sequence of checks to actually 
determine if it is the right target). 
 99. See Hayley Tsukayama, Malware is Linked to Stuxnet, Flame, WASH. POST, Aug. 10, 2012, at A03 
(asserting that Stuxnet was jointly developed by the United States and Israeli defense programs). 
 100. See Stuxnet: Computer Worm Opens New Era of Warfare, CBS NEWS (July 1, 2012, 7:03 PM), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-18560_162-57460009/stuxnet-computer-worm-opens-new-era-of-warfare/ 
(reporting that “someone sabotaged a top secret nuclear installation in Iran” using only computer code). 
 101. Id. The Stuxnet virus was spread through contact with an infected thumb drive. Id. 
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ability to develop nuclear weapons for a number of years.102 Yet, the broader 
security-related price of the Stuxnet attack on the Iranian nuclear plant may be high 
because the virus was reverse engineered after being identified.103 This means that 
computer code used to create target specificity has been cracked by hackers and 
Stuxnet’s coding tricks are now known to a wider audience than just the military.104 
In the future, could a hacker launch a Stuxnet-type attack on a specific hospital’s 
EMR system or a specific patient’s cEMD? The short answer seems to be “yes.” One 
example might be found in a hypothetical attack on a hospital’s heating, ventilation, 
and air conditioning (HVAC) system.105 
Infrastructural support of a client-server EMR (or any large-scale computer) 
system is critical for the system’s normal operation. For an EMR system, the 
infrastructure support required includes a reliable power source, an operating data 
network, and a functioning HVAC system.106 An excessive amount of heat can 
destroy a computer system and its data.107 Yet, given the importance we are placing 
on EMRs in our healthcare system, it is surprising that hospitals “often don’t have 
guidelines for securing . . . the HVAC systems that maintain the strict 
environmental controls over operating rooms and surgical wards,”108 let alone to 
securely provide for temperature control support for their EMR systems. This lack 
of concern for the operational details of a hospital’s HVAC systems thus creates an 
e-security risk that can compromise a hospital’s EMR system. In fact, at least one 
hospital has had its HVAC hacked without apparent harm.109 
EMR hostage-taking is not new. In 2009, the Washington Post reported on how 
hackers broke into a Virginia State website and compromised eight million patients’ 
medical records.110 These thieves then threatened to delete all the records if a 
ransom of $10 million was not paid.111 Unfortunately these hackers overlooked one 
 102. See Dominic Basulto, Stuxnet, Flame and Fulfilling the Dream of Sun Tzu, WASH. POST (June 1, 2012, 
10:38 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/innovations/post-stuxnet-flame-and-fulfilling-the-dream-
of-sun-tzu/2012/06/01/gJQA61Jv6U_blog.html (“It appears the line between ‘covert action’ and ‘act of war’ is 
blurring like at no time in history in one of the world’s most volatile regions.”). 
 103. See Nicole Perlroth, Computer Is Stealing Data Across Middle East, Report Says, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 
2012, at B4 (reporting that the “Flame” virus, unlike the “Duqu” virus, was likely developed by a group of 
programmers unaffiliated with the production of Stuxnet). 
 104. See Misha Glenny, A Weapon We Can’t Control, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2012, at A19 (describing Stuxnet’s 
widespread availability as an “escap[e] into the cyberwild”).  
 105. See, e.g., Ajay Gupta, Hackers, Breaches and Other Threats to Electronic Records, 19 HEALTH DATA 
MGMT., Sept. 2011, at 54 (recounting an incident in Texas of an HVAC system being hacked).  
 106. See STEVEN LEVY, IN THE PLEX 191 (2011) (describing the utilities needed to operate a Google data 
center). 
 107. Antenna Type Can Affect Picture, ATLANTA J.-CONST., May 30, 2012, at E15. 
 108. Gupta, supra note 105, at 55. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Hackers Break into Virginia Health Professions Database, Demand Ransom, WASH. POST (May 4, 2009), 
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/securityfix/2009/05/hackers_break_into_virginia_he.html. 
 111. Id. 
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detail: Virginia had a backup system for its EMRs, so the State was able to avoid 
having to meet the hackers’ ransom demand.112 Given the ability of certain viruses to 
hone in on a specific target, in the future individual cEMDs may be targeted. In the 
21st century, many cEMD have computers. Two such devices are insulin pumps and 
heart rhythm regulatory devices (pacemakers and defibrillators).113 
Insulin pumps are medical devices worn by diabetics to regulate their blood 
sugar.114 Insulin pumps have two basic components: a wireless sensor that detects 
blood sugar levels and a pump for insulin administration. The sensor’s function is 
to monitor the patient’s blood sugar and then send this information to the pump 
via a radio frequency (RF) signal.115 The pump, which houses the system’s 
computer, takes the patient’s blood glucose as input and then calculates and 
administers an appropriate dose of insulin to the patient.116 
Recently, a hacker reverse engineered an insulin pump to learn its secrets.117 One 
of the key findings of this reverse engineering process was the discovery that the RF 
signal between the sensor and the pump was unencrypted.118 The hacker then 
demonstrated how a $10 radio frequency circuit board could be used to reprogram 
and corrupt the pump’s algorithm for insulin delivery.119 Had this not been a 
planned demonstration, but rather a direct attack on an insulin pump attached to a 
patient, the outcome might have been fatal. 
A similar demonstration has also been carried out on an implantable cardiac 
defibrillator. Unlike the insulin pump, heart rhythm regulatory devices are self-
contained units in that their sensory and output leads are directly connected to the 
device’s computer.120 In other words, there is no RF signal. However, all heart 
rhythm regulatory devices are programmable. The device’s settings are modified by 
an electromagnetic signal. Thus, heart rhythm regulatory devices are analogous to a 
 112. Id. 
 113. For non-cardiac specialists, the key difference between a pacemaker and a defibrillator is the latter’s 
ability to deliver an electric shock when the device detects certain potentially fatal heart rhythms. MERRIAM-
WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 326 (11th ed. 2008) (defining defibrillator as “an electronic device that 
applies an electronic shock to restore the rhythm of a fibrillating heart”); id. at 833 (defining pacemaker as “an 
electronic device for stimulating or steadying the heartbeat or reestablishing the rhythm of an arrested heart”). 
 114. See Howard Simmons, Insulin Pumps Give Diabetics Flexibility, SPRINGFIELD NEWS-LEADER (Missouri), 
Feb. 12, 2007, at 10E (explaining benefits of insulin pumps over other types of pancreatic function 
modification). 
 115. See Dean Takahashi, Insulin Pump Hacker Says Vendor Medtronic is Ignoring Security Risk, VENTURE 
BEAT (Aug. 25, 2011), http://venturebeat.com/2011/08/25/insulin-pump-hacker-says-vendor-medtronic-is-
ignoring-security-risk/ (revealing that a hacker found a weakness in the devices that was created by their 
wireless connectivity). 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. See Janet Moore, Timing of Defibrillator News is No Shock; On the Eve of a Major Meeting of Doctors, 
Medtronic and Boston Scientific Hoped to Garner Attention for their New Heart Devices, STAR TRIB. 
(Minneapolis), May 14, 2008, at 1D. 
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semi-open computer system.121 When the defibrillator demonstration was carried 
out on a non-implanted defibrillator,122 the hackers were able to “reprogram [the 
device] to shut down and to deliver jolts of electricity that would potentially be fatal 
if the device had been in a person.”123 Accordingly, this demonstration project, like 
the insulin pump demonstration project, suggests hackers could convert cEMD 
from life-saving devices into murder weapons. 
C. Encryption 
Few doubt that encryption enhances e-security. Yet, the statistics on EMR e-security 
breaches suggest that healthcare providers rarely use encryption.124 For the 
encryption process to be effective, therefore, both the sender and the receiver must 
have access to the cypher’s key. If the two parties know each other well, a 
symmetric-key encryption system, which uses a single cypher key, can be used.125 A 
single key encryption system is predicated on both the sender and the receiver 
sharing a single secure encryption key.126 A single key cypher system worked well 
more than 100 years-ago when remote newspaper reporters telegraphed their 
reports to the home office, as both parties had a copy of the same code book.127 
Unfortunately, there are three principle drawbacks to using single key encryption 
in the healthcare sector. First, single key encryption is at the mercy of human 
fallibility (e.g., one party may lose a copy of the code book or inappropriately 
disclose the code to a third-party).128 Second, single key encryption systems do not 
work well in hospitals (or large law firms) because the encryption key must be 
 121. As a self-contained computer system, it is tempting to analogize a heart rhythm regulatory device to a 
closed CS system. But this would be wrong. From time to time it is clinically necessary to change the settings of 
heart rhythm regulatory device with an externally applied electromagnetic signal. See generally Gabriel 
Gregoratas et al., ACC/AHA Guidelines for Implantation of Pacemakers and Antiarrhythmia Devices, 31 J. AM. C. 
CARDIOLOGY 1175 (1998). Thus the computer system of a heart rhythm regulatory device is more analogous to a 
semi-open computer system. See supra Part II.A. 
 122. Barnaby J. Feder, Computer Security Team to Report Hacking Into Defibrillator-Pacemaker, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 12, 2008, at C4. 
 123. Id.  
 124. Diane Bartz, Electronic Medical Records Rarely Encrypted: Expert, REUTERS, Nov. 9, 2011, available at 
http://www.reutersreprints.com; cf. Daniel R. Levinson, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN 
SERVS., A-18-09-30160, AUDIT OF INFO. TECH. SEC. INCLUDED IN THE HEALTH INFO. TECH. STANDARDS 5 (2011) 
(observing that many serious EMR e-security breaches occur because laptop computers are not encrypted). 
 125. CGI GROUP INC., PUBLIC KEY ENCRYPTION AND DIGITAL SIGNATURE: HOW DO THEY WORK? 3 (2004), 
available at http://www.cgi.com/cgi/pdf/cgi_whpr_35_pki_e.pdf. 
 126. Id. 
 127. GLEICK, supra note 11, at 154. To a degree, a single cypher key system was used to keep a news story 
under wraps. But a more important reason was money. Telegraph operators charged the sender ¼ cent per 
word. Id. at 152. To keep number of words down, reporters used a code that was only known to them and the 
home office. Id. at 153. 
 128. See Eric A. Hibbard, Encryption: The Basics, in DATA BREACH AND ENCRYPTION HANDBOOK 180 (Lucy 
Thomson ed., 2011). 
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shared with too many individuals.129 Third, single key encryption does not work well 
when two healthcare providers who have never met each other must exchange PHI 
for a patient they have in common.130 
To work around the limitations of single key encryption, asymmetric key or 
public-key infrastructure (PKI) encryption was developed.131 In PKI encryption 
both parties have a pair of keys: one key is personal and private and one key is 
stored in the public domain.132 In practice, PKI works in a manner that is analogous 
to a safety deposit box type security system.133 That is, a key from both the sender 
and the receiver must be used to decipher a PKI encrypted message. In the real 
world, each PKI key is a large prime number and the two keys are multiplied 
together to obtain the ultimate key for encryption. So when the sender uses their 
private key to encrypt a message it is combined (multiplied) with the receiver’s 
public key to produce the ultimate cypher key.134 The resulting encrypted message 
may then only be decoded by using the receiver’s private key and the sender’s public 
key.135 
So, why do EMR systems not make better use of PKI encryption? The answer is 
that the devil is in the details for generating the encryption keys. First, performing 
PKI encryption requires a lot of computational power.136 Large hardware computing 
capacity requirements mean that the price tag for EMR systems with encryption will 
be larger than EMR systems without encryption. Thus, from the perspective of 
healthcare providers, the higher cost of EMR systems with PKI encryption may 
make the system less desirable. 
 129. Cf. CGI GROUP, supra note 125 (explaining that single key cryptography requires that all users be given 
the same key by sophisticated mechanisms, which are difficult to coordinate among a greater number of 
individuals). 
 130. David L. Gripman, Electronic Document Certification: A Primer on the Technology Behind Digital 
Signatures, 17 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 769, 775 (1998); see also CGI GROUP, supra note 125 
(describing a secure single key distribution mechanism as necessarily very “sophisticated”). 
 131. Of course, PKI is not infallible. John Markoff, Flaw Found in Online Encryption Method, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 15, 2012, at B4 (observing that method for generating PKI prime numbers is flawed); see also GLEICK, supra 
note 11, at 370 (quantum computing theoretically can factor large numbers for their prime factors). 
 132. Gripman, supra note 130, at 776. 
 133. Hibbard, supra note 128, at180. The public key is no more a security risk then a bank’s key to a safety 
deposit box. The reason has to do with the astronomical number of public keys that could be combined with 
single key to open an encrypted message. See id. 
 134. For those interested in a little more detail, the key to PKI encryption is its use of large prime number. 
Assume the ultimate encryption key is a very large number that is the product of two large prime numbers. 
Because of the rarity of prime numbers and astronomical size of the ultimate encryption key, the latter is almost 
impossible to hack. Although identifying two large prime numbers and multiplying them is relatively easy; 
running this operation in reverse is very difficult. GLEICK, supra note 11, at 370. 
 135. CGI GROUP, supra note 125, at 3. 
 136. See Junzuo Lai et al., Self-Generated Certificate Public Key Encryption Without Pairing and its 
Application, 181 INFO. SCI. 2422, 2422 (2011) (arguing that PKI faces a number of challenges, including storage 
limitations on computer systems). 
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Second, encryption makes interoperability among the various EMR systems in 
the market more difficult.137 The computer code that generates and stores pairs of 
PKI keys, as well as the actual encryption process, is often vendor-dependent.138 So, 
if two EMR systems are running different vendors’ PKI encryption programs, 
sharing PHI may be impossible. Given that there are a number of encryption 
vendors in the market,139 until some healthcare authority articulates a universally 
accepted standard for EMR PKI encryption, it is likely that encryption and 
interoperability will maintain their adversarial relationship.140 
III. Hackers: A New Public Health Risk 
To paraphrase F. Scott Fitzgerald, cyberscribes “are different from you and me.”141 
Cyberscribes not only have a unique understanding of computers and computer 
languages, but many of the better cyberscribes may understand human behavior 
better than the rest of us.142 This part of the Article examines what motivates hackers 
and how hackers use social engineering. 
In times past, hacker activity was almost exclusively driven by ego.143 Today, 
money is increasingly supplanting ego as the prime motivator of hackers.144 This 
trend appears to be applicable to EMR e-security where hackers carefully identify 
 137. Interoperability is the ability of one computer system to interact and exchange information with 
another computer system. James C. Dechene, The Challenge of Implementing Interoperable Electronic Medical 
Records, 19 ANNALS HEALTH L. 195, 195 (2009). Without interoperability of EMR systems, patients would be 
locked into a particular provider because they would not be able to transfer their EMR to new provider. See id. 
at 199 (stating that in order to be useful, “[a]ny EMR from any system should be readily available and 
integrated into any other EMR system in use by any other provider”). Cf. Arash Anoshiravani et al., 
Implementing an Interoperable Personal Health Record in Pediatrics: Lessons Learned at an Academic Children’s 
Hospital, 3 J. PARTICIPATORY MED. 3 (2011) (explaining that the need for interoperability is greater in pediatric 
populations because patients change providers more frequently than adults). 
 138. See JOINT INTEROPERABILITY TEST COMMAND, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, PKI INTERAGENCY/PARTNER 
INTEROPERABILITY TESTING (2012), available at http://jitc.fhu.disa.mil/pki/pke_lab/partner_pki_testing/partner_ 
pki_status.html (stating that “vendor selection” has contributed to difficulties in PKI interoperability). 
 139. Cf. id. (testing interoperability of several PKIs produced by different vendors). Currently there are 
numerous encryption standards, but encryption software is becoming increasingly standardized and may enable 
widespread interoperability between encrypted PHI in the future. Id. 
 140. The HITECH Act does not mandate the use of encryption, but does provide an administrative safe 
harbor when an e-security breach only compromises encrypted PHI. Breach Notification for Unsecured 
Protected Health Information, 74 Fed. Reg. 42740 (effective Sept. 23, 2009) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 
164). Specifically, when an e-security breach results in only encrypted PHI being accessed, the HITECH Act’s e-
breach reporting requirements can be avoided. Id. 
 141. F. SCOTT FITZGERALD, RICH BOY (1926), reprinted in THE DIAMOND AS BIG AS THE RITZ AND OTHER 
STORIES 171 (Stuart Hutchinson ed., Wordsworth Eds. Ltd. ed. 2006) (“[The rich] are different from you and 
me.”). 
 142. KEVIN D. MITNICK & WILLIAM L. SIMON, THE ART OF DECEPTION 8 (Wiley & Co. eds., 2002) [hereinafter 
“DECEPTION”]. 
 143. Cf. GHOST, supra note 22, at 6, 38, 43 (describing the thrill and encouragement that hackers sometimes 
receive through their illegal activity). 
 144. GLENNY, supra note 18; see also DECEPTION, supra note 142, at 7 (differentiating hackers “motivated by 
financial gain” from earlier, ego-driven hackers). 
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well-defined targets for their potential pecuniary gain.145 Indeed, hackers view 
medical identity theft (MIT), which is a “twist” on personal identity theft (PIT),146 
as a very lucrative field.147 
The street value of MIT information is fifty times that of PIT information.148 
These divergent street values for medical and personal identities arise from two 
factors: the potential demand for medical identities is greater than that for personal 
identities; and the time to detect MIT is much longer than that for PIT.149 In part, 
the demand for person-specific medical insurance information, the sine quo non of 
MIT, arises from the masses of Americans who are either un- or underinsured.150 
Given that more than 50 million individuals in the United States are uninsured, the 
potential market for MIT is staggering.151 In addition, because the perpetration of 
MIT requires the pairing of medical insurance information and personal identity 
information, the supply of medical identities is much less than the supply of 
personal identities.152 As hackers sell both personal and medical identities in 
 145. DECEPTION, supra note 142, at 7. 
 146. FED. TRADE COMM’N, FTC FACTS FOR CONSUMERS: MEDICAL IDENTITY THEFT 1 (2010), 
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/consumer/idtheft/idt10.shtm. 
 147. Latour “LT” Lafferty, Medical Identity Theft: The Future Threat of Health Care Fraud is Now, J. HEALTH 
CARE COMPLIANCE, Jan.–Feb. 2007, at 11, 15. Careful readers may notice that this Article, in essence, conflates 
the unauthorized access of protected health information (PHI) with MIT. To a degree this is true and we are 
well aware that the unauthorized access of PHI and MIT are not synonymous. However, as used in this Article, 
MIT is viewed primary from the vantage point of the hacker who gains the unauthorized access to an EMR 
system in order to obtain access to PHI and insurance information. After all, hacking an EMR system provides 
cyberscribes with one-stop shopping for both components of medical identities. One-stop shopping is a more 
efficient method for obtaining medical identities than independently obtaining (stealing) an individual’s 
personal identity and their insurance information. See id. at 12–13 (describing MIT as a subset of PIT). 
Accordingly, as used herein, the conflation of the unauthorized access of PHI and MIT is reasonable. See, e.g., 
Ansh Patnaik, HITECH, Medical Data Privacy and Fraud, EXEC. INSIGHT (Nov. 16, 2010), http://healthcare-
executive-insight.advanceweb.com/Features/Articles/ 
HITECH-Medical-Data-Privacy-and-Fraud.aspx (cybercriminals “target general PII [personally identifying 
information] to execute identity theft”). 
 148. Press Release, Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., Study: Few Aware of Risk of Medical ID Theft (June 13, 
2012), available at http://www.nationwide.com/newsroom/061312-MedicalIDTheft.jsp. In general, PHI without 
insurance information is worthless, unless it is celebrity PHI. Jim Rutenberg, The Gossip Machine, Churning Out 
Cash, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 2011, at A1. 
 149. See Joseph Conn, A Real Steal, 36 MODERN HEALTHCARE 26 (2006).  
 150. FED. TRADE COMM’N, MEDICAL IDENTITY THEFT: HOW TO MINIMIZE YOUR RISK (2010), 
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/consumer/alerts/alt179.pdf. In contrast, PIT can be accomplished with as 
little as a Social Security number. See SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, IDENTITY THEFT AND YOUR SOCIAL 
SECURITY NUMBER 2 (July 2012), available at www.ssa.gov/pubs/10064.html (describing what types of identity 
theft may be accomplished with a Social Security number). 
 151. Amy Lee, Number of Uninsured Americans Soars to Over 50 Million, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 27, 2010, 
11:39 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/12/27/uninsured-americans-50-million_n_801695.html. 
 152. The specific need for a real patients’ medical insurance information, as opposed to a simple Social 
Security number, is the likely reason that MIT accounts for only 3% of all identity thefts. See FED. TRADE 
COMM’N, FTC RELEASES SURVEY OF IDENTITY THEFT IN THE U.S. STUDY SHOWS 8.3 MILLION VICTIMS IN 2005 
(2007), available at www.ftc.gov/opa/2007/11/idtheft.shtm (stating that three percent of MIT victims reported 
their personal information was used to obtain medical treatment). 
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underground commodity-like black markets located on the Internet, end users have 
the opportunity to bid up the price of MIT.153 However, the degree to which such 
bidding drives up the price of MIT is unknown.154 
Yet, in part, the premium paid for medical identities is driven up by the presence 
of institutional end users in this black market.155 Institutional end users of medical 
identities are in a position to submit multiple fraudulent claims to an insurer, 
whereas individual users of medical identities are only in a position to make one 
large purchase.156 Hence, healthcare professionals and bogus healthcare institutions 
are much more willing to pay a premium for medical identities because these 
institutional end users are in a position to leverage health insurance information.157 
To illustrate, consider how an individual and an institutional provider utilize a 
single medical identity. Assume an individual patient, who lacks health insurance 
coverage, has coronary artery disease and is in need of a coronary artery bypass 
grafting (CABG) operation. With a purchase of a medical identity from a black 
market Internet site, the patient acquires a CABG operation. From the individual 
patient’s perspective, this one-time fraud is worth approximately $20,000, i.e., the 
dollar-value of CABG operation.158 Now suppose a crooked (or fake) hospital 
obtains the same medical identity information. To leverage this medical identity, 
the hospital first files a claim with an insurer for providing a fictitious $20,000 
CABG operation.159 Then the hospital has this fictitious patient develop a number of 
billable complications such as postoperative pneumonia ($5,500) and an abnormal 
heart beat that requires a pacemaker ($12,000).160 Thus from the hospital’s 
perspective the total value of this fraud is approximately $37,500. As the value of the 
leveraged medical identity to the hospital is worth almost twice the amount that the 
medical identity is worth to the individual patient, then all other factors being 
 153. The Cyber-Crime Black Market: Uncovered, PANDA SEC. 13 (2010), http://press.pandasecurity.com/wp-
content/uploads/2011/01/The-Cyber-Crime-Black-Market.pdf (“These types of markets operate in line with the 
normal laws of supply and demand.”); see also GLENNY, supra note 18. 
 154. See generally The Cyber-Crime Black Market: Uncovered, PANDA SEC. 13 (2010), 
http://press.pandasecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/01/The-Cyber-Crime-Black-Market.pdf. 
 155. Pam Dixon, Medical Identity Theft: The Information Crime that Can Kill You, 1 WORLD PRIVACY F. REP. 
37, 37 (2006) (explaining how organized crime schemes have begun to engage in medical identity theft). 
 156. Id. at 38. 
 157. Jonathan Ginsberg, Medical Identity Theft a Growing Problem, BANKR. L. NETWORK (Apr. 21, 2012), 
http://www.bankruptcylawnetwork.com/medical-identity-theft-a-growing-problem. As used in this section, 
“healthcare professionals” are viewed as any legitimate healthcare provider who may occasionally launder some 
MIT through their organization’s collection system. Ginsberg’s use of “bogus clinics” suggests that he views the 
leveraging of MIT in a narrower, more criminal context. 
 158. Thomas R. McLean & Valerie Lawson, Heart Hospitals, Medicare, and Cross-Subsidization, 7AM. HEART 
HOSP. J. 94, 96 tbl. 3 (2009) (this figure has been rounded-off and represents the approximate Medicare 
Allowable Reimbursement figure for Coronary Artery Bypass Grafting). 
 159. See, e.g., Latour “LT” Lafferty, Medical Identity Theft: The Future Threat of Health Care Fraud is Now, J. 
HEALTH CARE COMPLIANCE, Jan.–Feb. 2007, at 11, 14 (describing an incident of leverage resulting in submission 
of $2.8 million in false claims). 
 160. McLean & Lawson, supra note 158, at 96. 
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equal, one would expect a crooked hospital to pay about twice as much money as 
the individual patient would pay for a medical identity. 
The ability of an institutional provider to leverage MIT is related to long latency 
period between the actual commission of MIT and its detection. When a personal 
identity is stolen its street value is relatively low because the time between the theft 
of the personal identity information and the detection of the crime is relatively 
limited — perhaps to as little as 30 days.161 After a stolen personal identity has been 
in circulation for more than 30 days, the individual whose identity was stolen often 
notices unauthorized charges on credit card bills or starts to receive bills from 
companies that they have no prior relationship.162 Additionally, financial 
institutions that are involved in credit lending are highly adept at spotting financial 
fraud.163 
MIT, on the other hand, which is predicated on the theft of insurance 
information, is in a different situation.164 Unlike VISA and American Express, health 
insurers do not routinely send out monthly statements.165 In general, insurers only 
send out a statement of benefits after a claim for services has been made.166 Even 
then an insurer may not send the statement to the patient’s attention for one or two 
billing cycles.167 This delay in sending a patient-policy holder information regarding 
care that was allegedly rendered to the patient is a key reason that institutional 
healthcare providers are able to leverage MIT.168 
For the victims of MIT, the long latency period between the commission of an 
act and its detection can have devastating consequences.169 These consequences may 
be psychological, financial, or both. The psychological damages associated with 
 161. Katherine M. Sullivan, But Doctor, I Still Have Both Feet! Remedial Problems Faced by Victims of Medical 
Identity Theft, 35 AM. J. LAW & MED. 647, 655 (2009) (indicating that person will generally discover a stolen 
identity within a month, when they receive a credit statement).  
 162. Id. at 31 (finding that “52 percent of victims of financial identity theft discovered the misuse of their 
personal information ‘by monitoring the activity in their accounts’”). 
 163. Id. at 39. Moreover, with online banking, personal identity theft can theoretically be detected within 
hours. Assume John Doe, living in Austin, TX, goes to dinner on Friday night. On Saturday morning, he wakes 
up and checks his transactions online to make sure he was charged the correct amount for his dinner. Upon 
logging on he discovers that 2 minutes after he authorized the transaction for his dinner, a $25 charge occurred 
for 2 beers at Wrigley Field in Chicago. It would be fair for John Doe to assume that someone had his credit 
card information and was using his identity to be a bleacher bum in Chicago. 
 164. Id. at 5 (defining MIT). 
 165. Id. at 31 (observing that the mechanisms banks and credit card companies use to detect fraudulent 
activity are not feasible solutions in detecting MIT). 
 166. See Sullivan, supra note 161, at 656 (describing the administrative process following a claim for 
benefits). 
 167. Id. at 656. This statement is especially true if the healthcare provider has not filed a timely claim for 
reimbursement with the insurer. 
 168. Id. at 656 (attributing late notification of MIT victims to lags in healthcare billing and processing). 
 169. Medical ID Theft is Latest Twist on Identity Theft, CBS NEWS 4 DENVER (May 1, 2012, 10:53 AM), 
http://denver.cbslocal.com/2012/05/01/medical-identity-theft-is-latest-twist-on-identity-theft (moreover, MIT 
can be “almost impossible for a victim to fix”). 
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MIT arise because the imposter’s medical information often becomes comingled 
with the victim’s medical information.170 This comingling of the imposter-legitimate 
patient information can trigger fears in the legitimate patient that they will receive 
the wrong treatment.171 For example, one non-diabetic victim of MIT worried about 
being erroneously treated with insulin after a diabetic impostor stole her medical 
information.172 Worse, the victims of MIT are often saddled with significant 
financial damages. On average, victims of MIT spend $20,000 to clean up their 
medical records.173 The loss of insurance coverage must often be added to this 
figure. Although several reasons have been articulated for why insurers cancel a 
health insurance policy after it has been stolen, the bottom line for the victims of 
MIT is that 48% of these individuals lose their healthcare insurance coverage.174 
The flip side of the victims’ losses are the hackers’ net gains, which are 
potentially substantial, especially in aggregate.175 To illustrate the net profits that can 
flow from a hackers’ attack on an EMR system, assume that four hackers form an 
equal partnership to engage in MIT.176 The partnership targets the EMR system at 
Man’s Best Friend (MBF), a large, well-endowed hospital, located in the fictional 
city of Megopolis, with a population of 17 million people. 
The partnership’s first step is to identify hospital insiders who can facilitate the 
MIT. To this end the partnership purchases a report for $120177 from a data 
aggregator that contains a profile of everyone living in Megopolis.178 From this 
report, the partnership identifies all individuals in Megopolis employed by MBF, 
and from these individuals the partnership identifies three hospital insiders who 
work in the hospital’s IT department and are highly likely to have a drinking 
 170. BOOZ ALLEN HAMILTON, OFF. NAT’L COORDINATOR HEALTH INFO. TECH., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & 
HUMAN SERVS., MEDICAL IDENTITY THEFT ENVIRONMENTAL SCAN 9 (Oct. 2008). 
 171. See Diagnosis: Medical Identity Theft, BLOOMBERG BUS. WK., Jan. 7, 2007, available at 
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/07_02/b4016041.htm (accounting for one woman’s worry 
about being treated according to inaccurate medical records). 
 172. Id. Theoretically, HIPAA directs that patients are to have access to their EMR so that they can make 
corrections when necessary. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.524, 164.528 (2011) (giving patients the right of access to their 
protected health information and the right to an accounting of disclosures of protected health information). As 
this vignette demonstrates, laws are often more Platonic ideals and less like the bureaucratic real world. See 
generally Plato, THE REPUBLIC (Project Gutenberg ed., Benjamin Jowett trans. 2008). 
 173. PONEMON INST., supra note 4, at 13. 
 174. Id. at 10; see Dixon, supra note 155, at 29 (“Victims of identity theft can be denied insurance due to 
imposter activity.”). 
 175. PONEMON INST., supra note 4, at 1, 14 (finding that the average value of stolen services, products and 
pharmaceuticals was $29,464 and, as there were an estimated 1.85 million people affected, this could come out 
to $54.5 billion per annum). 
 176. While this is a hypothetical, the stratagems employed herein are modeled on the real life adventures of 
ex-hacker Kevin Mitnick. See generally GHOST, supra note 22. 
 177. Marc Porcelli, ISP Targeting Ad Company Phorm Gets Targeted (Mar. 23, 2008), 
http://www.marcporcelli.com/2008/03/23/isp-targeting-ad-company-phorm-gets-targeted (data aggregators 
charge advertisers $4 to $12 per million individuals for a focused audience). 
 178. For a more detailed discussion of data aggregators, see infra note 197 and accompanying text. 
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problem.179 The partnership then spends $21,000 on these three employees by 
purchasing them a weekend trip to Las Vegas, where the employees are wined, 
dined, and compromised.180 For their trouble, the partnership learns the MBF’s 
EMR is cloud-based system that has an e-security risk in the form of an unpatched 
backdoor. 
The partnership then purchases a computer system for $35,000181 and spends 
$48,000 to develop targeted malware.182 The malware is coded so as to locate the 
MBF’s EMR system’s backdoor and then attach itself to MBF’s EMR system. The 
attack enables the hacker to copy and email different patients medical records — 
including PHI and insurance information — to the partnership. This process 
continues until the partnership has possession of 8 million medical identities,183 at 
which point the partnership elects to shut down its attack. 
The partnership now has to launder these 8 million medical identities. Assume 
here that the partnership is able to sell only half of these medical identities because 
it fears that by selling all 8 million simultaneously, it will flood the black market 
thereby driving down the price per medical identity. Indeed, during the course of 
four cyber auctions held during the next year,184 the partnership is able to sell 2 
million medical identities for $50 each on average, but is only able to sell an 
 179. This would not be hard to do. For example, consider an individual who makes credit card purchases 
from a liquor store for $20,000 per year but who makes no other purchase consistent with throwing parties. 
Such an individual is likely to be either an alcoholic or a serious sommelier. Data aggregators may also find 
other information indicating excessive drinking habits. 
 180. This figure is based on the average cost to wine and dine government workers at a recent scandalous 
lobbying event. Courtney Subramanian, GSA Scandal: So What Does $823,000 Buy You in Las Vegas?, TIME 
NEWSFEED (Apr. 18, 2012), http://newsfeed.time.com/2012/04/18/gsa-scandal-so-what-does-823000-buy-you-
in-las-vegas; see also GLENNY, supra note 18, at 32 (perpetrators of Internet fraud “invest considerable effort in 
trying to find disgruntled or distressed” employees who have the type of knowledge that will facilitate the 
planned crime).  
 181. Michelle Stephenson, EHR Computing: In-House or in the Cloud?, REV. OPHTHALMOLOGY (Jan. 10, 
2012), http://www.revophth.com/content/c/31831 (noting that “[f]or the client-server option, the up-front fee 
is typically $35,000”). 
 182. This figure is a rough estimate based on the cost of launching a botnet attack, which is a different type 
of an attack than described here. See Pierluigi Paganini, How Much Does Malware Production Cost? Which Are 
the Processes for the Production of Virus? (Part.2), SEC. AFFAIRS (Dec. 6, 2011), 
http://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/430/cyber-crime/how-much-cost-malware-production-which-are-the-
processes-for-the-production-of-virus-part-2.html. See generally GHOST, supra note 22, (costs could be less for 
the attack described here if the hacker knew of specific vulnerabilities and how to attack them). But see generally 
GLENNY, supra note 18. 
 183. This figure is based on the MIT from a Virginia hospital. See Brian Krebs & Anita Kumar, Hackers 
Want Millions for Data on Prescriptions, WASH. POST, May 8, 2009, at B01. 
 184. See Erin Kenneally & Jon Stanley, Beyond Whiffle-Ball Bats: Addressing Identity Crime In An Information 
Economy, 26 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 47, 88 (2008) (citing DEAN TURNER ET AL., SYMANTEC 
INTERNET SECURITY REPORT: TRENDS FOR JANUARY-JUNE 2007 (2007), available at http://eval.symantec.com/ 
mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/ent-whitepaper_internet_security_threat_report_xii_09_2007.en-us.pdf) 
(describing an online underground economy for selling stolen identities); see also GLENNY, supra note 18. 
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additional 2 million medical identities for $25 each on average.185 Of course, because 
the cyber platform that runs the auction is dealing in stolen goods, the partnership 
has to pay the cyber platform a 20% commission.186 The partnership is now ready to 
unwind and distribute the millions of dollars of net proceeds of the enterprise. 
Table II summarizes the partnership’s finances. The approximately $100,000 to 
fund this operation could be a real entry barrier for those individuals who are not 
seriously interested in a life of MIT. Still, these expenses are little more than round 
off error when the size of the net revenue to the partnership is considered. The 
bottom line is that the four individual partners would each pocket about $30 
million. 
Table II: Hypothetical MIT Enterprise Financials 
Expenses:   Revenue:  
Data Aggregator Report $ 120 2 M identities at $50 $100 million 
Cost of Information $ 21,000 2 M identities at $25 $  50 million 
Computer $ 35,000
Software development $ 48,000 Less Commission ($  30 million) 
 
Net expense $104,120 Net revenue $ 120 million 
Based on these figures, MIT is likely to be profitable at volumes much lower than 
those used in this hypothetical. This fact alone suggests that as more and more 
healthcare providers purchase EMRs during the next three years,187 the incidence of 
MIT is likely to continue to rise, unless hackers’ incentives are changed.188 Second, 
the primary barrier to committing MIT (after software development) appears to be 
the ability to distribute medical identities to end users.189 As more hackers enter the 
 185. The disparate prices for medical identities used herein are an attempt to reflect real world situations. 
Cyberscribes do fear that flooding the market with MIT may drive the per unit price down. See Kenneally & 
Stanley, supra note 184 at 49–50 (citing Free Market, INVESTORWORDS.COM (last visited Oct. 9, 2012), 
http://www.investorwords.com/2086/free_market.html); see also GLENNY, supra note 18; FED. TRADE COMM’N, 
FTC FACTS FOR CONSUMERS: MEDICAL IDENTITY THEFT (2010) (adopting the view that the commission of MIT is 
analogous to the commission of PIT). In the real world, not every patient has health insurance. So, given our 
premises, it would be illogical for us to assert that cyberscribes could obtain a medical identify from every 
record they hacked. 
 186. See GLENNY, supra note 18 (cyber auction houses get a cut of the gross proceeds); see also Sean Rocha, 
How Does a Sotheby’s Auction Work, SLATE (May 7, 2004), available at http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_ 
politics/explainer/2004/05/how_does_a_sothebys_auction_work.html. Although establishing the average 
commission rate for illegal cyber auctions is difficult for obvious reasons, it is not unreasonable to assume that 
many such transactions have maintained the 20% figure for commissions of legitimate transactions. 
 187. See infra Part IV. 
 188. See infra Part IV. 
 189. See DEAN TURNER ET AL., SYMANTEC INTERNET SECURITY REPORT: TRENDS FOR JANUARY-JUNE 2007 41 
(2007) available at http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/ent-whitepaper_internet_ 
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MIT market, the need to distribute stolen medical identities will tend to limit 
market growth.190 In part, hackers who subsequently enter the market will stifle 
market growth by flooding the market with medical identities thereby driving down 
the price per medical identity.191 And in part, just as the credit lending financial 
institutions have become adept at detecting financial fraud, as more bogus medical 
identities circulate in the healthcare market, health insurers are likely to become 
more knowledgeable about how MIT is perpetrated192 and are hence likely to 
become more efficient in detecting MIT.193 
In the above hypothetical, the hacker enterprise wines and dines insiders to get 
information. In the world of hackers, this type of information gathering is referred 
to as social engineering. Broadly speaking, social engineering encompasses the 
techniques used by one individual to gain the trust of another individual such that 
the second individual reveals confidential information to the former.194 In their 
book, The Art of Deception, Mitnick and Simon chronicle the various social 
engineering techniques that are used by hackers to gain confidential information 
about their targeted computer systems.195 For the most part, the trust building 
techniques of social engineering, which require a modicum of patience, allow the 
hacker to obtain valuable information like passwords, authentication procedures, 
and information about the nature of a computer system.196 
security_threat_report_xii_09_2007.en-us.pdf (showing that criminals use underground economy servers to sell 
stolen information). 
 190. The market for MIT data will follow the diminishing returns law. See DONALD RUTHERFORD, 
ROUTLEDGE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 105 (Taylor & Francis ed. 2005). 
 191. See sources cited supra note 185. 
 192. Cf. GLENNY, supra note 18. Credit lending agencies are disinterested in identifying or disclosing PIT 
and other cyber frauds. In part, this is because credit-lending agencies do not want the public and their 
competitors to know that they have been hacked; and in part this is because such agencies have a moral hazard. 
Id. As credit lending agencies have PIT insurance, these agencies are all too willing to write off losses to PIT and 
cyber fraud, which are covered by insurers. Of course, the insurers will then raise the credit lending agencies 
premiums, but these agencies then pass the premium costs off to debtors in the form of higher fees. Id. 
 193. For example, EMR administrators should be looking for medical information that is transferred during 
the dead of night, in unusual volumes, or to unusual destinations. E.g., MCAFEE, SECURITY AND PRIVACY OF 
ELECTRONIC MEDICAL RECORDS 4 (2012) available at http://www.mcafee.com/us/resources/white-papers/wp-
security-privacy-medical-records.pdf. However, a detailed discussion of the standard of care for an EMR 
administrator is beyond the scope of this Article. See generally Beyond the HIPAA Privacy Rule: Enhancing 
Privacy, Improving Health Through Research, REP. BRIEF (Inst. Med., Wash., D.C.), Feb. 2009, at 1 available at 
http://www.iom.edu/~/media/Files/Report%20Files/2009/Beyond-the-HIPAA-Privacy-Rule-Enhancing-
Privacy-Improving-Health-Through-Research/HIPAA%20report%20brief%20FINAL.ashx (detailing problems 
with protecting patient privacy under HIPAA regulations). 
 194. See DECEPTION, supra note 142, at iv (describing social engineering); see also GLENNY, supra note 18, at 
24 (“[I]t is a little-appreciated fact the very best computer managers are as talented in managing the social and 
psychological expectations as they are fixing widgets.”). 
 195. DECEPTION, supra note 142. 
 196. See Daniel E. Geer, Jr., Cybersecurity and National Policy, 1 HARV. NAT’L SECURITY J. 203, 208 (2010) 
(“[W]ithout universal strong authentication, tomorrow’s cybercriminal will not need the fuss and bother of 
maintaining a botnet when, with a few hundred stolen credit cards, he will be able to buy all the virtual 
machines he needs from cloud computing operators.”). 
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Certain cyberscribes — or more exactly, organizations of cyberscribes — known 
as data aggregators specialize in such data collection.197 For example, using multiple 
online sources, data aggregators like Spokeo198 have compiled as many as 1,500 data 
points for every Internet user.199 Based on these profiles, data aggregators will 
develop composite profiles (“second selves”) for each Internet user; and these 
profiles can then be purchased by advertisers to develop individual-specific 
marketing strategies.200 
Our second selves’ composites are not cyber doppelgangers of our real world 
selves. Still, the second selves are not unreasonable facsimiles of our real world 
selves.201 These second selves offer insight into our strengths and weaknesses. Second 
selves can suggest to advertisers which of us are religious, enjoy alcohol, or take 
risks. In addition, these second selves can suggest to hackers how best to social 
engineer us.202 After all, social engineering is nothing more than “human hacking” 
in that it involves the profiling of an individual by piecing together all the little bits 
of the person’s identity specific data, including: name, age, birthday, and personal 
preferences.203 In the hypothetical of the hacker criminal enterprise, the partnership 
purchased a data aggregator’s report to streamline their social engineering attack. 
This is not to say that aggregator-based social engineering will replace all human 
mediated social engineering. In our hypothetical, once the partnership had 
identified the three IT employees who had a potential drinking problem, the 
partnership still had to have some of their members personally socialize with these 
employees to gain their trust. But, group personality profiles from data aggregators 
will almost certainly act as a catalyst for human mediated social engineering. So, if 
the MIT market does expand in parallel with our use of EMRs, it is likely that data 
aggregators will see a rising demand for the profiles of current and former 
healthcare providers, hospital administrators, and hospital maintenance workers, 
since these individual might have valuable insider information.204 
 197. E.g., Joseph Nocera, Data Theft: How to Fix The Mess, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2005, at C1 (describing the 
activities of a data aggregator). 
 198. See ANDREWS, supra note 85, at 9 (describing the creation of Spokeo); see also LEVY, supra note 106, at 
46 (As Google uses personal data when composing its online advertisements, Google is almost certainly the 
largest data aggregator). 
 199. ANDREWS, supra note 85, at 35. 
 200. Id. at 35. 
 201. Id. at 35; see also GLENNY, supra note 18. 
 202. See DECEPTION, supra note 142, at iv (observing that by posing as another individual, “the social 
engineer is able to take advantage of people to obtain information”). For example, if a cyberscribe knows that 
members of the targeted organization are religious (think of the right to life movement), the cyberscribe may 
use a religion-based phishing attack to gain insider’s trust. 
 203. See generally CHRISTOPHER HADNAGY, SOCIAL ENGINEERING: THE ART OF HUMAN HACKING (2010). 
 204. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Att’y Off. N.D. Ga., Atlanta Man Sentenced on Computer Hacking Charge 
(Jan. 10, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/gan/press/2012/01-10-12.html (reporting the 
prosecution of a man charged with specifically targeting computers in a medical practice to aggregate personal 
information on patients of that practice).  
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Moreover, with sufficient social engineering, current employees may be enticed 
into participating in a medical information embezzlement scheme.205 To cope with 
health information technology employees who are susceptible to, or who are 
actively being compromised by hackers, hospital risk managers should consider 
stepping up their counter-intelligence programs. Given the value of medical 
identities, hospitals need to identify and help health information technology 
employees who are at risk of social engineering tactics.206 
Indeed, an MIT epidemic seems to be just around the corner. During a 
recent three-year period one report found that the incidence of MIT had 
doubled;207 while other reports document more modest growth in MIT (in the 
range of 32%208 to 47%209 per year). Similar to the existing epidemic in PIT,210 
which is predicated on the ability of criminal organizations to exploit 
jurisdictional and legal loopholes in overseas countries,211 the coming epidemic 
of MIT will also be driven by social engineering and favorable economics that 
promote organized criminal activity.212 The Obama administration’s $29 billion 
stimulus for the conversion of paper medical records to EMR by 2015213 could be 
 205. See Assoc. Press, California: U.C.L.A. Reports Theft of Patient Data, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2011, at A11 
(citing statistics and an example of hospital employees illegally accessing medical records). The potential for 
using MIT to defraud healthcare providers has already been discussed. Such a fraud scheme does not necessarily 
have to involve the business owners and could easily be perpetrated by a financial manager with access to billing 
and accounts receivable. See also infra Part IV (describing HIPAA criminal litigation). 
 206. See Chris Apgar et al., Mitigating Medical Identity Theft, 79 J. AHIMA 63, 66 (2008) (recommending 
that healthcare employers “[e]nsure appropriate background checks of employees and business associates, both 
prior to hiring and in high-risk areas, as well as periodically after hiring. Consider minimizing the use of 
noncredentialed or nonlicensed individuals in temporary positions if they are not bound by professional codes 
of conduct or ethics”). 
 207. N. Nedim Halicioglu, The Rise of Medical Identity Theft, VALLEY BUS. J. 1, 
http://www.valleybusinessjournal.com/archived-front-page-articles/420-the-rise-of-medical-identity-theft- (last 
visited Oct. 15, 2012). 
 208. PONEMON INST., supra note 4, at 5 (showing a 32% increase in per capita cost of data breach from 2005 
to 2006). 
 209. Patient Medical Records Hacking: The Unintended Consequences of Health Care Reform, LWG 
CONSULTING, http://www.lwgconsulting.com/casestudy/default.aspx?CaseStudyId=156 (last visited Sept. 22, 
2012) (citing 2008 Data Breach Total Soars: ITRC Reports 47% Increase Over 2007, IDENTITY THEFT RESOURCE 
CENTER (2009) available at http://www.idtheftcenter.org/artman2/publish/m_press/2008_Data_Breach_Totals_ 
Soar.shtml). 
 210. See Brian Krebs, Organized Crime behind a Majority of Data Breaches, WASHINGTONPOST.COM (Apr. 15, 
2009, 10:22 AM) http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/04/15/AR2009041501196.html 
(citing VERIZON BUSINESS, 2009 DATA BREACH INVESTIGATIONS REPORT 6 (2009), available at 
www.verizonbusiness.com/resources/security/reports/2009_databreach_rp.pdf (reporting that data breaches in 
2008 affected “roughly 285 million consumer records”)). 
 211. GLENNY, supra note 18. 
 212. See VERIZON BUS., 2010 DATA BREACH INVESTIGATIONS REPORT 2 (2010), available at 
http://www.verizonbusiness.com/resources/reports/rp_2010-data-breach-report_en_xg.pdf (showing a recent 
16% increase in the use of social tactics in data breaches). 
 213. See HITECH Act, Pub. L. No. 111–5, § 13001, 123 Stat. 226 (2009) (requiring utilization of EHRs for 
all patients by 2014); see also David Blumenthal, Wiring the Health System – Origins and Provisions of a New 
Federal Program, 365 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2323, 2323 (2011) (observing that even though this technology stimulus 
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like throwing gasoline on a fire.214 Currently, only 40% of healthcare providers are 
using EMR.215 So, a shift to nationally-sponsored EMR adoption is likely to more 
than double the number of EMR systems in use during the next five years.216 
For many cash strapped healthcare providers,217 monies from the Obama 
stimulus package are unlikely to cover the full cost of conversion to an EMR 
system.218 Consequently, it is possible that the majority of EMR systems that become 
operational in the next few years are likely to be the less secure, but more 
economical, cloud-based systems.219 Less secure EMR systems and the lucrative 
returns associated with MIT will invite criminal organizations into the MIT market. 
A similar evolution from individual hackers seeking thrills to organized criminal 
activity occurred in the PIT market. Where PIT was once a crime of opportunity,220 
it is increasingly a planned gang related activity.221 
package is to be paid out over ten years, such funding of technology by the United States government is virtually 
unprecedented). 
 214. “The widespread, accelerated diffusion of [IT] technology resulting from recent legislation [the 
HITECH Act] may engender unintended consequences manifested in various ways throughout those 
organizations under pressure to accommodate the changes.” Meryl Bloomrosen et al., Anticipating and 
Addressing the Unintended Consequences of Health IT and Policy: A Report from the AMIA 2009 Health Policy 
Meeting, 18 J. AM. MED. INFORM. ASSOC. 82, 87 (2011). 
 215. ERIC JAMOOM ET AL., DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., NHCS DATA BRIEF NO. 98, PHYSICIAN ADOPTION 
OF ELECTRONIC HEALTH RECORD SYSTEMS: UNITED STATES, 2011 (July 2012), available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/databriefs/db98.pdf. 
 216. This assumes that number of healthcare providers remains constant; an assumption that is unlikely to 
be true. See Barry Liss, The Current Wave of Hospital Consolidation: Cause and Effect, METRO. CORP. COUNS. 8 
(Feb. 22, 2012) http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/articles/17931/current-wave-hospital-consolidation-cause-
and-effect (the nation’s economy and economic incentives under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act [Pub. L. 111–148 (2010)] will result in hospital closures and overall market consolidation); see also MERRITT 
HAWKINS, HEALTH REFORM AND THE DECLINE OF PHYSICIAN PRIVATE PRACTICE: A WHITE PAPER EXAMINING THE 
EFFECTS OF THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT ON PHYSICIAN PRACTICES IN THE UNITED 
STATES 4 (2010) (same with respect to physicians); Thomas R. McLean, The 80-Hour Work Week: Why Safer 
Patient Care Will Mean More Health Care Is Provided By Physician Extenders, 26 J. LEGAL MED. 339, 341 (2005) 
(the impact of patient safety and economics will mean fewer physicians will be needed in the market). 
 217. See supra note 216. 
 218. See infra Part IV. 
 219. See supra Part II.A. If EMR systems do evolve to become less secure, one of Congress’ intended 
outcomes for the HITECH Act will be defeated. “Congress recognized that expanding the use of health IT 
would be futile if patients and providers came to feel that their information was safer in a paper chart than in 
electronic format. Therefore, HITECH was seen as the right time to update and strengthen” HIPAA’s privacy 
and security rules. Pete Stark, Congressional Intent for the HITECH Act, 16 AM. J. MANAG. CARE SP24, SP26 
(Supp. 2010). 
 220. From 2004 to 2007 large scale cyberscribe activity was historically opportunistic in that the computer 
systems targeted by cyberscribes where selected because of known e-security flaws rather than the identity of the 
user. In more recent years, 90% of the computer systems targeted by cyberscribes were selected after the 
cyberscribes had “carefully picked their targets first and then figured out a way to exploit them.” See Krebs, 
supra note 210 (citing VERIZON BUS., 2009 DATA BREACH INVESTIGATIONS REPORT (2009), 
http://www.verizonbusiness.com/resources/security/reports/2009_databreach_rp.pdf). 
 221. E.g., Charles Arthur, Court Papers Reveal Hacker Worked for FBI, AUSTRALIAN FIN. REV., Mar. 7, 2012, 
http://afr.com/p/technology/court_papers_reveal_hacker_worked_WXtfHK9KoyWcqa5ZAil8cL (reporting that 
a particular hacking crew of ten people undertook several concentrated attacks against specific institutional 
targets). See also GLENNY, supra note 18. 
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For many, the more evolutionary view of cybercrime may appear strange. This is 
because our societal images of cybercrime are rooted in the motion picture 
industry, which views hackers as college-aged kids on a misadventure222 or 
correcting a social injustice.223 This antiquated view, however, is no longer valid. 
Today, 85% of PIT is committed by gangs with organized goals.224 The complexity 
of code writing, coupled with the importance of social engineering to cybercrime,225 
means that these gangs have had to develop divisions of labors amongst their 
members.226 And, according to the Obama administration, many of these gangs are 
“tied to traditional Asian and Eastern European organized crime organizations.”227 
As MIT is every bit as complex, sophisticated, and organized as PIT, organized 
criminal gangs seem destined to enter the MIT market. Already, the size and scope 
of many healthcare e-security breaches suggest the extent to which MIT is 
becoming increasingly organized.228 As one commentator has observed, MIT is 
frequently “carried out by organized crime rings — often with the help of corrupt 
health care workers.”229 This observation raises an interesting question: Will MIT 
gangs be dominated by foreign hackers to the extent that PIT is dominated by 
foreign hackers?230 
As of today, this question remains hypothetical. Our review of healthcare e-
security breaches failed to identify a single hacker attack of an EMR system that 
involved foreign nationals. Still, from a legal point of view, if MIT is committed by 
overseas gangs of hackers, obtaining effective jurisdiction over these hackers is likely 
to become a substantial issue in curtailing MIT.231 Under the Constitution, Congress 
has the power to punish felonies “committed on the high Seas and Offense against 
 222. E.g., SNEAKERS (Universal Pictures 1992). 
 223. E.g., THE ITALIAN JOB (Paramount Pictures 2003). 
 224. GLENNY, supra note 18. 
 225. See VERIZON BUS., 2010 DATA BREACH INVESTIGATIONS REPORT 2 (2010), available at 
http://www.verizonbusiness.com/resources/reports/rp_2010-data-breach-report_en_xg.pdf (showing a recent 
16% increase in the use of social tactics in data breaches). 
 226. See Kenendra Srivastava, Obama Says Hacks Are Organized Crime, Wants Stiffer Penalties, MOBILE 
MEDIA (Sept. 9, 2011, 11:35 AM), http://www.mobiledia.com/news/107373.html (reporting that PITs are 
“complex and sophisticated electronic crimes are rarely perpetrated by a lone individual”); see also GLENNY, 
supra note 18. 
 227. Srivastava, supra note 226. 
 228. Krebs, supra note 210 (citing VERIZON BUS., 2009 DATA BREACH INVESTIGATIONS REPORT 6 (2009), 
available at www.verizonbusiness.com/resources/security/reports/2009_databreach_rp.pdf). 
 229. Dale Dixon, The Biggest Threat in Medicine: Medical ID Theft, IDAHO PRESS-TRIB. BLOG (Apr. 11, 2011, 
12:52 PM) http://www.idahopress.com/blogs/business_to_business/dale_dixon_-_better_business_bureau/the-
biggest-threat-in-medicine-medical-id-theft/article_0d7c6f8a-c2b9-11e0-8302-001cc4c03286.html. 
 230. Most PIT is perpetrated by Chinese, Russian, and other Eastern Europeans on Americans, the British, 
and Canadians. There are many reasons for this pattern of criminal activity, including culture and legal systems. 
See generally GLENNY, supra note 18. 
 231. See Stephan Wilske & Teresa Schiller, International Jurisdiction in Cyberspace: Which States May 
Regulate the Internet, 50 FED. COMM. L.J. 117, 120 (1997) (observing that “[j]urisdictional questions have 
become increasingly complex with the explosion in Internet usage and technology”). 
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the Law of Nations”232 and to “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations.”233 Thus, 
under Article I of the Constitution, the United States does have extraterritorial 
jurisdiction for criminal acts that occur here. Unfortunately, the scope of this 
extraterritorial jurisdiction is not unlimited and a number of obstacles (both 
practical and diplomatic) to the enforcement of extraterritorial jurisdiction exist.234 
IV. Cyberlaw as a Deterrent to EMR e-Security Breaches 
So, if during the next five years healthcare providers uniformly adopt cloud-based 
EMRs and organized gangs of hackers are formed, which have the tools, know-how, 
and economic incentives to commit MIT, what is there to deter them? 
Conceptually, a deterrence to hacker attacks could be created by enacting laws with 
harsh penalties that impose sufficient economic disincentives to dissuade hackers 
from committing MIT; or alternatively, the conditions under which our healthcare 
payment system operates could be changed so that the street value of PHI 
plummets to zero. We begin with an examination of the relevant laws. 
There are numerous federal anti-hacker laws, including: HIPAA,235 as modified 
by the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health 
(HITECH) Act236 (which is part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 
2009);237 the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA),238 with its two 
principle components the Federal Wiretap Act (FTWA)239 and Stored 
Communication Act (SCA);240 and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA).241 
As HIPAA has been a federal law for almost two decades, basic knowledge of this 
law is assumed.242 In addition, because the scope of the CFAA is limited to situations 
 232. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10. 
 233. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.  
 234. See generally CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., NO. 94-166, EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF 
AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW (Feb. 15, 2012). 
 235. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–191, § 1, 110 Stat. 1936 
(1996). 
 236. HITECH Act, Pub. L. No. 111–5, § 13001, 123 Stat. 226 (2009). 
 237. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111–5, § 1, 123 Stat. 115 (2009). The 
dollar value of the “Stimulus Act,” id., is fantastic. If you had spent a million dollars a day, every day since the 
year 0 C.E., the total money available under this Act would still be more.  
 238. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99–508, § 101, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986). 
 239. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–22 (2006). 
 240. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–12. 
 241. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2006). 
 242. However, the key concepts relevant to understanding this Article with respect to HIPAA and the 
HITECH Act (Privacy & Security Rule, covered entity, and business associates) are briefly reviewed. In the 
healthcare context, hackers seek to obtain Protected Health Information (PHI), and not control of, or the 
ability to take down a computer. If an e-document contains PHI, then covered entities, 45 C.F.R. §164.530 
(2011), and business associates, 42 U.S.C.A. § 17921(2) (2012), have certain obligations to protect the 
confidentiality of the document. See infra notes 243–97 and accompanying text.  
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of unauthorized access to the federal government’s computers,243 this Act will also 
not be discussed further.244 
A. HITECH Act 
The HITECH Act is a dual purpose act. The Act’s first purpose is to stimulate the 
use of EMR such that virtually all healthcare providers will be using an EMR system 
by the end of 2014.245 Based on the Obama administration’s calculations, the 
HITECH Act’s liberal distribution of $20 billion for EMR conversion startup 
money246 would ultimately return to the government $80  billion in annual 
savings.247 
The second purpose of the HITECH Act is to regulate the transmission of EMRs 
and cEMD e-data.248 Under HITECH, HIPAA’s regulations regarding the handling 
and transmission of EMRs are modified by two mechanisms: the creation of a new 
 243. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a) (2006). CFAA’s scope reaches to the extent of the Act’s jurisdiction so the Act 
covers computers with “information of the federal government, consumer credit or other kinds of financial 
information, and information acquired from a protected computer.” CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
97-1025, CYBERCRIME: AN OVERVIEW OF THE FEDERAL COMPUTER FRAUD AND ABUSE STATUTE AND RELATED 
FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS 16 (2010). Cf. United States v. Nosal, 642 F.3d 781 (9th Cir. 2011) (noting the scope of 
CFAA does not extend to cover employees who merely misappropriate government files in violation of 
employer’s work policy).  
 244. Most of the principles articulated in the CFAA are similar to those found in the HITECH Act and 
ECPA. Perhaps one key difference between the CFAA and the other acts discussed herein is that under the 
CFAA the criminal penalties for violating the Act (up to 20 years (18 U.S.C. § 1030(c)(1)(B) (2006))) are 
substantially harsher than the penalties for violation of the HITECH Act or ECPA. See infra Parts IV.A–B. 
However, the CFAA should be kept in mind by attorneys involved in litigation that concerns e-security breaches 
involving the Department of Veterans Affairs’ EMR system. 
 245. Robert Steinbrook, Health Care and the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, 360 NEW ENG. J. 
MED. 1057, 1059 (2009) (the Congressional Budget Office projects the incentives will result in the adoption of 
comprehensive EHRs by 90% of physicians and 70% of hospitals by 2019). 
 246. See Helen Christophi, EHRs Fuel Controversy in Healthcare Industry, HC+O NEWS (Jan. 25, 2011), 
http://www.hconews.com/articles/2011/01/25/ehrs-fuel-controversy-in-healthcare-industry (beginning in 2015 
providers who have not adapted EMR technology will be penalized). The amount of stimulus dollars provided 
by the HITECH Act for EMR adoption ranges from $20 to $29 billion, a spread of roughly 30%. Compare id. 
(Federal government appropriated $20 billion for the computerization of patients health records), with PATIENT 
MEDICAL RECORDS HACKING: THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF HEALTH CARE REFORM, 
http://www.lwgconsulting.com/casestudy/default.aspx?CaseStudyId=156 (last visited Apr. 1, 2012) (Federal 
government appropriated $29 billion for the computerization of health records). As HITECH’s stimulus dollars 
are to be released over a decade and depend on the degree to which providers embrace meaningful use, see Part 
IV.A, the literature values for the HITECH stimulus package are not necessarily incompatible (depending on 
the assumptions the authors made). Herein we used the figures found in our source material, but recognize that 
from paragraph to paragraph the dollar-value of the HITECH stimulus package shifts. 
 247. Christophi, supra note 246. But see Danny McCormick et al., Giving Office-Based Physicians Electronic 
Access to Patients’ Prior Imaging and Lab Results Did Not Deter Ordering of Tests, 31 HEALTH AFF. 488, 491 
(2012) (demonstrating that doctors who have access to EMRs are 40% more likely to order imaging studies than 
those using paper medical records); see Steve Lohr, Digital Records May Not Cut Health Costs, Study Cautions, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2012, at B1.  
 248. See generally HITECH Act Expands HIPAA Privacy and Security Rules, COPPERSMITH, GORDON, 
SCHERMER & BROCKELMAN PLC, http://www.azhha.org/member_and_media_resources/documents/HITECH 
Act.pdf (last visited Apr. 14, 2012). 
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reporting requirement for major e-security breaches and the expansion of 
enforcement actions through both the enlargement of the scope of the Privacy and 
Security Rules249 and through the creation of heightened penalties for non-
compliance.250 
The HITECH Act modifies HIPAA’s personal notification requirements for e-
security breaches and creates a new public notification requirement.251 Under 
HIPAA, covered entities (CEs) are required to maintain an audit trail.252 If this audit 
trail (technically metadata)253 reveals that a patient’s PHI254 has been compromised, 
the CE has an obligation to provide private notification of the e-security breach to 
patient-owner(s) of the PHI. Under the HITECH Act, in the event of an e-security 
breach,255 both CEs256 and Business Associates (BAs)257 are required to notify the 
patient-owners that their PHI has been compromised. Importantly, CEs and BAs 
are required to give such notification within sixty days of the security breach.258 
HITECH then goes further than HIPAA to create a public reporting requirement 
in the event of a major EMR security breach.259 There can be little doubt that a key 
reason behind the public reporting requirement for e-security breaches involving 
 249. A comprehensive discussion of HITECH’s expansion of the Privacy Rule is beyond the scope of this 
Article. However, topics not covered in detail here with respect to the expansion of the Privacy Rule include: 
under the HITECH Act, if the patient has paid for the service out of pocket, covered entities (CEs) must now 
honor a patient’s request to restrict disclosure of their PHI. 42 U.S.C.A. § 17935(a)(2) (2012); see also HITECH 
Act Expands HIPAA Privacy and Security Rules, supra note 248, at 5–6. In addition, when a CE does make a 
disclosure, it alone must make the determination of the minimally necessary amount of PHI to disclose. 42 
U.S.C.A. § 17935(b)(2) (2012). CEs may not receive any remuneration for the disclosure (without the patient’s 
approval). 42 U.S.C.A. § 17935(d)(1) (2012). Several exceptions (e.g., disclosures for public purpose or 
research) to this rule exist. 42 U.S.C.A. § 17935(d)(2) (2012); see also 42 U.S.C.A. § 17936(a) (2012) (limiting 
the remuneration a covered entity can receive for HIPAA permitted marketing). 
 250. See HITECH Act Expands HIPAA Privacy and Security Rules, supra note 248, at 8. 
 251. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 17932(e)(2) (2012) (outlining public reporting requirement). 
 252. See id. § 17932(f) (outlining the content of notification). 
 253. An automatically generated computer record that certifies how an electronic document has been 
manipulated. Thomas R. McLean, EMR Metadata Uses and E-Discovery, 18 ANNALS HEALTH L. 75, 75 (2009). 
 254. “[I]ndividually identifiable health information . . . that is transmitted by electronic media, maintained 
in electronic media, or transmitted/maintained in any other form or medium.” 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2011). 
 255. Under the HITECH Act a “breach” occurs when there has been “unauthorized acquisition, access, use, 
or disclosure of protected health information which compromises the security or privacy of such information.” 
42 U.S.C.A. § 17921(1)(A) (2012). Accordingly, HITECH’s definition for breach is broader than the concept of 
an e-security breach as it is used herein (which contemplates that a security breach occurs only when a 
cyberscribe gains unauthorized access to PHI). 
 256. A health plan, health care clearinghouse, or a health care provider who transmits any health 
information in electronic form in connection with a transmission of information between two parties to carry 
out financial or administrative activities related to health care. 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2011). Under the HITECH 
Act, for the most recent three-year period, patients can demand an accounting of all individuals who have 
accessed their PHI. 42 U.S.C.A. § 17935(c)(1)(B) (2012). 
 257. 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2011).  
 258. 42 U.S.C.A. § 17932(d)(1) (2012). However, when state law has stricter reporting requirements, that 
state law is not preempted by the HITECH Act’s reporting requirements. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 17951(a) (2012); 42 
U.S.C. § 1320d-7(a)(2)(B) (2012). 
 259. 42 U.S.C.A. § 17932(e) (2012). 
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EMRs is to decrease the long latency period between the time of commission and 
the time of detection of MIT.260 Under the HITECH Act, when the unsecured PHI 
of more than 500 patients (who are located in one state) has been compromised, the 
data custodian must notify “prominent media outlets” and the federal 
government.261 Failure to report a major e-security breach exposes the EMR data 
custodian to significant administrative fines.262 Since HITECH’s public notification 
requirement went into effect, more than 385 PHI e-security breaches have been 
reported to the government.263 Impressively, these EMR security breaches have 
involved the records of 19 million individuals (roughly 6% of the United States’ 
population).264 Of these EMR breaches, the largest occurred at Tricare in October 
2011 when 4.9 million EMRs were compromised.265 Consistent with other reports in 
the literature, the most common form of e-security breach (accounting for 39% of 
e-breaches) that has been reported to the federal government is the loss of a 
portable e-device (e.g., laptop computers and memory sticks) containing PHI.266 
Under the HITECH Act, the scope of HIPAA’s regulations has been extended to 
cEMD including: insulin pumps, defibrillators, and even email.267 We were unable 
 260. See supra Part III. 
 261. 42 U.S.C.A. § 17932(e)(2) (2012). The term “unsecured PHI” should be read as PHI that is not secured 
through the use of a technology or methodology certified by the U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services or an ANSI-accredited organization. 42 U.S.C.A. § 17932(h)(1)(A) (2012); see HITECH Act Expands 
HIPAA Privacy and Security Rules, supra note 248, at 3. 
 262. See Press Release, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, HHS Settles HIPAA Case with 
BCBST for $1.5 Million (Mar. 13, 2012). Given that the average cost to notify patients of an e-security breach is 
$200 per patient, when millions of EMRs have been compromised, a healthcare provider has an incentive to 
want to keep knowledge of the breach in house. See Pamela Lewis Dolan, Thinking of Buying Data Breach 
Insurance? Here Are Some Things to Consider, AMEDNEWS.COM (Jan. 31, 2011), www.ama-
assn.org/amednews/2011/01/31/bica0131.htm (last visited May 24, 2012). 
 263. Nicole Lewis, Health Data Breaches Up 97% in 2011, INFORMATIONWEEK (Feb. 13, 2012), 
http://www.informationweek.com/healthcare/security-privacy/health-data-breaches-up-97-in-2011/232600746 
(last visited Oct. 2, 2012) (reporting 385 breaches between October 2009 and November 2011).  
 264. Robin Erb, Data Breaches Put Patients at Risk for Identity Theft, USA TODAY (Feb. 12, 2012, 10:03 PM), 
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/health/story/health/story/2012-02-12/Data-breaches-put-patients-at-
risk-for-identity-theft/53065576/1 (last visited Oct. 2, 2012); see USA QuickFacts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (2011), 
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/00000.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2012) (reporting a population of 
313,914,040 in 2012). 
 265. Joseph Conn, Tricare Reports Data Breach Affecting 4.9 million Patients, MODERNHEALTHCARE.COM 
(Sept. 29, 2011, 5:45 PM), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20110929/NEWS/110929951 (last visited 
Oct. 2, 2012). 
 266. Lewis, supra note 263 (reporting that 39% of the 385 breaches between October 2009 and November 
2011 occurred on a laptop or other portable device). Sadly, 81% of healthcare entities use such devices; and 49% 
do not make attempts to protect them. Pamela Lewis Dolan, Smartphones Blamed for Increasing Risk of Health 
Data Breaches, AMEDNEWS.COM (Dec. 19, 2011), http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2011/12/19/bil21219.htm 
(last visited Oct. 2, 2012). 
 267. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 17921(5) (2012) (defining “electronic health record” as an electronic record of 
health-related information on an individual that is created, gathered, managed, and consulted by authorized 
health care clinicians and staff); see also Benjamin Wright, Health-care Data Tracking | Electronic Health Record 
(EHR), ELECTRONIC DATA RECORDS LAW | HOW TO WIN E-DISCOVERY (Aug. 17, 2009), http://legal-
beagle.typepad.com/wrights_legal_beagle/electronic-medical-records/ (last visited May 25, 2012) (reporting 
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to find documentation on the monetary impact of the HITECH Act’s regulations 
on medical device manufacturers. However, the cost of HITECH compliance is 
unlikely to be as onerous for cEMD manufacturers as it is for healthcare providers. 
The reason is that a cEMD already has a computer; so the cost of HITECH 
compliance to device manufacturers is limited primarily to software modification. 
On the other hand, it is likely that an e-security breach that was facilitated by a non-
compliance with HITECH would be especially damaging to a cEMD manufacturer’s 
reputation.268 
Indeed, an unintended, or perhaps intended,269 outcome of HITECH’s public 
reporting on healthcare providers and cEMD manufacturers may be the financial 
losses that flow from a major e-security breach. After such a breach, healthcare 
providers and cEMD manufacturers will be exposed to financial losses from 
administrative penalties,270 business losses,271 and the potential losses associated with 
defending a class action lawsuit.272 Deloitte has reported that nationally, EMR e-
that the HITECH Act’s accounting requirement applies to emails and e-records in medical devices and 
equipment). 
 268. Dolan, supra note 262 (“The biggest challenge is calculating the monetary loss from the damage to a 
practice’s reputation.”). 
 269. It is not hard to imagine that the framers of the HITECH Act anticipated that public reporting would 
trigger civil litigation. Just the same, the potential for such litigation gives the EMR and cEMD record 
custodians an incentive to ramp up their security systems. 
 270. Civil monetary penalties will be discussed in more detail, see infra this section. However, such penalties 
may be substantial. See Office of Civil Rights: Resolution Agreement, BLUE CROSS BLUE SHIELD OF TENNESSEE, 
www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/enforcement/examples/resolution_agreement_and_cap.pdf (last visited Apr. 
23, 2012) (noting an insurer was fined $1.5 million after failing to report a major e-security breach in a timely 
manner). 
 271. See Ajay Gupta, Hackers, Breaches and Other Threats to Electronic Records, HEALTHDATA MGMT. (Sept. 
1, 2011), http://www.healthdatamanagement.com/issues/19_9/hackers-breaches-and-other-threats-to-
electronic-records-43068-1.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2012); see also Chris Silva, Blue Cross Tenn. Pays $1.5 
million for HIPAA Violation, NASHVILLE BUS. J. (Mar. 13, 2012, 4:28 PM), http://www.bizjournals.com/ 
nashville/news/2012/03/13/blue-cross-tenn-pays-15-million-for.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2012) (reporting that 
after a major e-security breach, an insurer spent $17 million to cover the cost of the investigation and attorneys’ 
fees). 
 272. Neither HIPAA nor the HITECH Act creates a private right of action for healthcare e-security breaches. 
Still, class action lawsuits worth “millions and billions” were filed in 2011 for e-security breaches that occurred 
at Stanford University, Tricare, and Sutter Health System. Amy Catapano, Data Breaches: A Growing and 
Alarming Trend and a Potential Safe Harbor, HEALTHREFORMWATCH (Feb. 7, 2012), 
http://www.healthreformwatch.com/2012/02/07/data-breaches-a-growing-and-alarming-trend-and-a-potential 
-safe-harbor/ (last visited Apr. 5, 2012); see also Howard Anderson, SAIC Explains Insurance for Breach, 
GOVINFOSECURITY (Apr. 9, 2012), www.govinfosecurity.com/latest-news/p-8 (last visited Apr. 23, 2012) 
(reporting that seven class action lawsuits were filed as a result of the e-security breach that occurred at Tricare). 
Unfortunately, such class action litigation over e-security breaches typically falters for inability to prove 
recoverable damages. See First Line Of Defense In Privacy Class Actions – Damages, LAW360 (Sept. 22, 2011, 
12:57 PM) (“[A]s demonstrated by recent court decisions in California and New York, the inability to allege 
damages continues to pose significant obstacles for would-be class plaintiffs.”); see also Paul v. Providence 
Health System-Oregon, 273 P.3d 106 (Or. 2012) (dismissing a case where the plaintiffs sustained no actual 
damages after a provider lost physical control of unencrypted PHI). 
 Thomas R. McLean & Alexander B. McLean 
Vol. 8, No. 1 2013 95 
security breaches have resulted in total losses of $6 billion dollars.273 For healthcare 
providers’ organizations’ balance sheets, over the course of the two-years following 
an e-security breach, the cumulative business losses are approximately $2 million, 
which represents a loss of approximately $100,000 over the lifetime of the patient.274 
Others have calculated the business losses to healthcare providers for an e-security 
breach to be approximately $200 per compromised record.275 
The business losses associated with the public reporting of a major e-security 
breach are thus on an order of magnitude that can destroy a healthcare provider’s 
business. Given such risk exposure, it is not surprising that insurers have already 
entered the market. A detailed discussion of EMR e-security breach insurance is 
beyond the scope of this Article. However, it is worth noting that EMR e-security 
breach insurance policies are not all alike,276 and the coverage of many of these 
policies is severely limited, to the point where the policies may not mitigate the 
business losses associated with a major e-security breach.277 
Another aspect of the HITECH Act is its expansion of the scope of the Privacy 
and Security Rules with respect to so-called “business associates” and the creation 
of enhanced penalties for non-compliance with these rules by either CEs or BAs.278 
Under the HITECH Act, HIPAA’s definition of a BA remains unchanged,279 but 
enforcement shifts from contractual mechanisms to statutory mechanisms. Under 
HIPAA, CEs were mandated to enter into BA agreements whereby the BAs were 
contractually bound to comply with the Privacy280 and Security281 Rules. When a CE 
detects that a BA is non-compliant with HIPAA’s regulations, the CE is required to 
 273. See PONEMON INST., Benchmark Study on Patient Privacy and Security 1 (Nov. 9, 2010), 
http://www.dgshealthlaw.com/uploads/file/Ponemon_Benchmark_Study_on_Patient_Privacy_and_Data_Secur
ity%5B1%5D%281%29.pdf (last visited Oct. 2, 2012) (reporting that the total economic burden created by data 
breaches on U.S. hospitals as almost $12 billion over a period of two years). 
 274. Id. at 9 (“The extrapolated average lifetime value of one lost patient (customer) is $107,580.”). 
 275. See PONEMON INST., 2010 Annual Study: U.S. Cost of a Data Breach, 5 (Mar. 2011), 
http://msisac.cisecurity.org/resources/reports/documents/symantec_ponemon_data_breach_costs_report2010.
pdf (last visited Oct. 2, 2012) (“Data breaches in 2010 cost their companies an average of $214 per 
compromised record, up $10 (5 percent) from last year.”). 
 276. See Drew Becker, Implementing Electronic Medical Records (EMR): Mitigate Security Risks and Create 
Peace of Mind, Clarity: White Paper 1, 3–4 (2011), http://www.claritygrp.com/media/13028/hipaa_hitech_white 
paper_6.7.11_final.pdf (last visited Apr. 23, 2012) (explaining different types of cyber liability insurance 
products and their features). 
 277. See CyberGuard, THE DOCTORS CO., http://www.thedoctors.com/Coverages/ID_010509?refId=CYBER 
GUARD (last visited Oct. 2, 2012) (CyberGuard insurance only covers up to $50,000); see also Dolan, supra note 
262 (reporting that small physicians’ groups can purchase $1 million of e-security breach insurance for $5,000 
per year, but that the coverage purchased is limited to patient notification and does not cover fines).  
 278. See generally HITECH Act Expands HIPAA Privacy and Security Rules, supra note 248. 
 279. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 17921(2) (2012) (defining “business associate” as it has been defined at 45 C.F.R. § 
160.103 thereby leaving the definition unchanged). 
 280. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.504(e) (2011) (privacy rules). 
 281. See 45 C.F.R. § 160.308 (2011) (administrative safeguards); § 160.310 (physical safeguards); § 160.312 
(technical safeguards); § 160.316 (2011) (policies and procedures and documentation requirements). 
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bring a lawsuit against the BA.282 This is a weak enforcement mechanism. As the CE 
and BA are business partners, compelling one of these parties to bring litigation 
against the other is likely to drive a wedge between the two parties. Such litigation 
would not be good for either party’s balance sheet. Moreover, during such litigation 
the BA agreements were often found to be defective because they were inelegantly 
drafted.283 
The HITECH Act obviates this awkward business situation. By statute, BAs are 
now directly accountable for their compliance with the Privacy and Security rules.284 
From a practical point of view, this means that BAs must now comply with all the 
Security Rules’ administrative safeguards,285 physical safeguards,286 technical 
safeguards,287 and policy and documentation requirements.288 In the event that a CE 
or BA is noncompliant with these rules, the HITECH Act authorizes the Office of 
Civil Rights (OCR) to bring an enforcement action and seek civil and criminal 
penalties.289 
Given the OCR’s new statutory authorities over CEs and BAs, BA agreements 
may appear as a thing of the past. However, this would not be correct. BA 
agreements are still required under the HITECH Act, and those in existence are to 
be updated.290 BA agreements are needed to define the “steps a CE or BA must take 
 282. See Lora Bentley, HITECH Act Ramps up HIPAA Compliance Requirements, ITBUSINESSEDGE (Apr. 3, 
2009), http://www.itbusinessedge.com/cm/community/features/articles/blog/hitech-act-ramps-up-hipaa-comp 
liance-requirements/?cs=31575 (last visited Oct. 2, 2012) (“Before HITECH came into force . . . business 
associates that failed to properly protect patient information were liable to the covered entities via their service 
contracts, but they did not face governmental penalties.”). 
 283. See HITECH Act Expands HIPAA Privacy and Security Rules, supra note 248, at 2 (“[M]ost of those 
business associate contracts did not impose specific security requirements and did not require business 
associates to have written policies and documentation of security safeguards in place.”). 
 284. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 17934(a) (2012) (applying Privacy Rules to business associates); id. § 17931(a) (2012) 
(applying Security Rules to business associates). 
 285. See 45 C.F.R. § 160.308 (2011) (outlining administrative safeguards). 
 286. See id. § 164.310 (outlining physical safeguards). 
 287. See id. § 164.312 (outlining technical safeguards). 
 288. See id. § 160.316 (outlining policies and procedures and documentation requirements). 
 289. See HITECH Act Expands HIPAA Privacy and Security Rules, supra note 248, at 8. Under certain 
conditions the States’ Attorneys General are authorized to bring HIPAA enforcement actions. 42 U.S.C.A. § 
17939(e) (2012). While a detailed discussion of this HITECH Act enforcement mechanism is beyond the scope 
of this Article, this enforcement mechanism is being utilized. See Stacy Chubak Hinners, HIPAA Compliance: 
Why the Stakes Are Higher Now Than Ever Before, CORPORATECOMPLIANCEINSIGHTS.COM (Mar. 2, 2012), 
http://www.corporatecomplianceinsights.com/hipaa-compliance-why-stakes-higher-now-than-ever-before/ 
(last visited Apr. 22, 2012) (reporting that the Attorneys General for Indiana, Connecticut, and Vermont have 
brought successful HITECH enforcement actions). 
 290. 42 U.S.C.A. § 17931(a) (2012) (“The additional requirements of this title that relate to security and that 
are made applicable with respect to covered entities shall also be applicable to such a business associate and shall 
be incorporated into the business associate agreement between the business associate and the covered entity.”); 
see also Mark S. Hedberg, Practical Considerations: Business Associate Agreements Under the Proposed HITECH 
Rules, ABA HEALTH ESOURCE (Aug. 4, 2010), https://www.americanbar.org/newsletter/publications/aba_health_ 
esource_home/Volume6_12_hedberg.html (last visited May 24, 2012) (reporting that the HITECH Act requires 
business associate agreements to incorporate the new privacy and security provisions). 
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if it learns of a pattern or practice that constitutes a material breach of the 
agreement.”291 As ambiguity exists in the HIPAA and HITECH regulations, it is also 
recommended that the BA agreement should more clearly define the “BA’s 
obligations with respect to the minimum necessary standard, the prohibition on the 
sale of PHI, fundraising activities, marketing activities or research activities,” as well 
as to define reporting responsibilities in the event of e-security breach.292 
As an incentive for CEs and BAs to comply with the Privacy and Security Rules, 
the HITECH Act ramps up the civil monetary penalties (CMP) for e-security 
breaches and makes no distinction with regard to CE and BA liability.293 Under 
HIPAA, the CMP for non-compliance with the Privacy Rule started at $100 per 
violation and topped off at $25,000 for all violations in a single year.294 The HITECH 
Act, on the other hand, creates a four-tier scheme for assessing civil penalties.295 At 
the most venial level, acts of HIPAA non-compliance are still subject to a fine of 
$100.296 But more egregious acts of non-compliance are subjected to more severe 
CMP. At the top level, when the OCR finds that a CE or BA is non-compliant with 
HIPAA regulations and their non-compliance occurred because of “willful neglect,” 
the OCR may fine that business entity up to $50,000 per violation, but no more 
than $1.5 million per calendar year.297 (Parenthetically, under HITECH the failure 
to take remedial action within thirty days after an e-security breach is viewed as a 
willful violation of the regulations.298) 
Interestingly, HITECH’s tiered CMP scheme creates a conflict of interest for the 
OCR. Under the Act, the civil penalties that are collected by the OCR are to be 
funneled back to the OCR to fund its enforcement budget.299 So, the fact that OCR 
has become proactive with respect to its enforcement efforts is not surprising. In 
2012, the OCR awarded a $9 million contract to KPMG to audit 150 CEs for 
 291. Hedberg, supra note 290. 
 292. Id.  
 293. See Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act, Pub. L. No. 
111–5, § 13409, 123 Stat. 115, 271 (2009); see also 42 U.S.C. 1320d-6(a) (2006) (attaching liability generally 
rather than specifically to a business associate or covered entity). 
 294. See HITECH Act Expands HIPAA Privacy and Security Rules, supra note 248, at 8 (“The Act also 
increases the amount of civil penalties from the present $100 per violation (up to $25,000 per identical 
violation). . .”). 
 295. See HITECH Act, Pub. L. No. 111–5, §13410(d)(3), 123 Stat. 115, 273 (2009) (outlining four-tier 
scheme for assessing civil penalties). 
 296. Id. §13410(d)(3)(A). 
 297. Id. §13410(d)(3)(D). 
 298. See id. §13410(d)(3)(D) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-5(b)(3)(A) (2006)); see 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-
5(b)(3)(A)(ii) (2006) (“[T]he failure to comply is corrected during the 30-day period beginning on the first date 
the person liable for the penalty knew, or by exercising reasonable diligence would have known, that the failure 
to comply occurred.”).  
 299. 42 U.S.C.A. § 17939(c)(1) (2012). But see 42 U.S.C.A. § 17939(c)(3) (2012) (noting under certain 
conditions, victims of Privacy Rule violations may receive a share of the penalties collected). 
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HIPAA compliance.300 Under this program, CEs will be given little advance notice of 
the audit and CEs are expected to produce the requested documents within ten 
days.301 Should a CE not cooperate with the audit, the CE could face significant 
penalties.302 In the eyes of the OCR, non-cooperation with the audit process is 
willful neglect, which triggers the top tier for CMPs.303 In the case of Cignet Health, 
its two years of non-cooperation with an OCR’s investigation ultimately cost the 
organization $3 million in fines.304 
Criminal liability under the HITECH Act also has been increased for BAs. Under 
HIPAA, individuals who gained unauthorized access to PHI with the intent to sell, 
transfer, or use the PHI for personal or commercial gain were subject to a fine of up 
to $250,000, ten years imprisonment, or both.305 But because of the language used in 
HIPAA, only CEs were considered to have exposure for criminal liability.306 But the 
real issue with HIPAA’s criminal penalties was that they were mostly theoretical; 
prior to 2009, HIPAA violations were rarely subject to criminal prosecution.307 
Under HITECH, the government has retained its authority to enforce HIPAA 
violations criminally,308 and the maximum criminal penalty remains unchanged. 
However, the HITECH Act makes it clear that employees of CEs and “other 
individuals” can be held criminally liable for the unauthorized disclosure of PHI.309 
As used in § 13409, “other individuals” is an individual, regardless of CE employee 
status, who “without authorization, obtains or discloses such information 
 300. Hinners, supra note 289. OCR has also indicated that in subsequent years such random audits will be 
extended to BAs. Id. 
 301. Id. 
 302. See, e.g., HHS Office of Civil Rights Issues First Monetary Penalty for HIPAA Privacy Violation, SIDLEY 
AUSTIN LLP (Feb. 25, 2011), www.sidley.com/sidleyupdates/Detail.aspx?news=4736. 
 303. Id.  
 304. Id.  
 305. 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6(b)(3) (2006 & Supp. IV 2011). 
 306. Memorandum Opinion from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, for the General Counsel Dep’t of Health and Human Serv’s and the Senior Counsel to the 
Deputy Att’y Gen. on Scope of Criminal Enforcement under 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6 (June 1, 2005), available at 
www.justice.gov/olc/hipaa_final.htm. 
 307. Ian C. Smith DeWaal, HIPAA Post-“HITECH”: Health Information Privacy Enforcement, DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE (Nov. 4, 2009), www.aoami.org/omed09_dewaal1104_hipaa.ppt; see also Doreen Z. McQuarrie, HIPAA 
Criminal Prosecutions: Few and Far Between (Feb. 2007), http://www.law.uh.edu/healthlaw/perspectives/ 
2007/(DM)HIPAACrimCharges.pdf. 
 308. Technically a criminal action is not brought by the OCR, but rather by the Department of Justice upon 
a referral from the OCR. Nor does the OCR perform criminal investigations. See GLENNY, supra note 18, at 60 
(noting the principal cybercrime investigating agencies are the FBI, Secret Service, and the United States Postal 
Inspection Service). 
 309. 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6(a) (2006 & Supp. IV 2011) (stating a person “shall be considered to have obtained 
or disclosed individually identifiable health information in violation of this part if the information is 
maintained by a covered entity . . . and the individual obtained or disclosed such information without 
authorization”).  
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maintained by a covered entity.”310 Given that HITECH § 13409 “makes HIPAA’s 
criminal and civil penalties (42 U.S.C. § 1320d-5 and § 1320d-6) applicable to 
business associates,”311 there is an argument that Congress did not intend hackers to 
be considered as other individuals. After all, Congress could have specifically stated 
that hackers were to be included as “other individuals” under the statute. 
It will be interesting to see if courts do construe hackers to be “other individuals” 
within the meaning of the HITECH Act,312 and whether the courts construe the 
HITECH Act as an anti-hacking statute.313 Of the HIPAA criminal cases that have 
been publically reported in detail, all have involved CEs (healthcare providers or 
their employees) and in none of these cases was the unauthorized access to PHI 
obtained by a hacker hacking an EMR system.314 Thus far only two HITECH 
criminal actions have been brought.315 In one case, the government took action 
against a psychiatrist who had been disciplined by the State of Virginia for having 
 310. Teresa K. Culver et al., Health Information & Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act 
(“HITECH”), MARTINDALE (Apr. 3, 2009), available at http://www.martindale.com/health-care-law/article_ 
Miller-Martin-PLLC_662398.htm; see also Lisa J. Acevedo & Jennifer L. Rathburn, Medical Privacy Enforcement 
and Penalties: HIPAA Gets Teeth, in HEALTH CARE LAW ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE: LEADING LAWYERS ON 
UNDERSTANDING RECENT TRENDS IN HEALTH CARE ENFORCEMENT, UPDATING COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS, AND 
DEVELOPING CLIENT STRATEGIES (INSIDE THE MINDS) (2011), available at http://www.quarles.com/files/ 
FileControl/c0df14d7-6e02-44e6-8b71-c6080df99f71/7483b893-e478-44a4-8fed-f49aa917d8cf/Presentation/File 
/Medical_Privacy_Enforcement.pdf.  
 311. HITECH Act Expands HIPAA Privacy and Security Rules, supra note 248, at 2. 
 312. See infra Part IV.B (discussing that under the EPCA, gaining unauthorized access to a computer that is 
privately owned, without more, does not trigger criminal liability).  
 313. We suspect that the courts will ultimately rule that using hacking techniques to gain access to PHI in an 
EMR system is a criminal act. But even if courts do not so hold, an individual who does use hacking techniques 
to gain access to PHI in an EMR system still faces HITECH criminal liability when they attempt to use the PHI. 
See 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6(b) (2006 & Supp. IV 2011). 
 314. See United States v. Zhou, 678 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 2012) (Zhou was a physician and CE employee who 
exceeded his level of authorization when he obtained the prohibited PHI); United States v. Ferrer and Machado, 
06-60761 CR (S.D. Fla. Sept. 11, 2006) (similar issue as Ramirez); United States v. Williams, 1:06-CR00129-
UNA (D. Del. Nov. 16, 2006) (non-CE employee pled guilty to illegally obtaining PHI and grand theft for 
exceeding her authorized access to a hospital computer, but hacking was not an issue); Plea Agreement, United 
States v. Gibson, No. CR04-0374RSM, 2004 WL 2237585 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 19, 2004) (while the phlebotomist 
defendant engaged in criminal conduct, it is not clear that HIPAA was used to determine his liability); Ian C. 
Smith DeWaal, Successfully Prosecuting Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act Medical Privacy 
Violations Against Noncovered Entities, U.S. Att’ys Bulletin, July 2007, at 10, 14–15 (discussing United States v. 
Ramirez, No. 7:05-CR-00708 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 30, 2006), where employee pled guilty to selling PHI, but 
computer hacking was not an issue); see also Memorandum Opinion for the General Counsel Dep’t of Health and 
Human Servs. and the Senior Counsel to the Deputy Att’y Gen. on Scope of Criminal Enforcement under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1320d-6, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (June 1, 2005), www.justice.gov/olc/hipaa_final.htm (the Office of Legal 
Counsel opined that the scope of HIPAA’s criminal enforcement extends only to CEs; but non-CEs may accrue 
criminal liability according to the principles of conspiracy and aiding and abetting); cf. United States v. 
Abdallah, No. H-07-155, 2007 WL 4570189 (S.D. Tex. July 1, 2009) (holding that because an ambulance driver 
is not a CE, there was no HIPAA criminal liability).  
 315. DOJ Steps Up Enforcement With Indictment of ‘Loose Lips’ Doctor, Hospital Visitor, HEALTH BUS. DAILY 
(July 15, 2011), http://aishealth.com/archive/hipaa0711-01; Atlanta Man Sentenced on Computer Hacking 
Charge, U.S. ATTY’S OFFICE (Jan. 10, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/usao/gan/press/2012/01-10-12.html. 
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“spoke[n] out of turn to an ‘agent’ of an employer of a former patient.”316 In the 
second case, the defendant was a healthcare provider who was incidentally found to 
be in the unauthorized possession of PHI when a search warrant was executed for 
other reasons.317 In both of these cases,318 the defendant was a CE and neither 
defendant was accused of engaging in hacker activities. So, the answer as to whether 
a hacker is an “other individual” under the HITECH Act will have to wait until a 
more appropriate case arises. 
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of HIPAA criminal enforcement actions may 
be the low threshold for the demonstration of criminal intent. In the United States 
v. Zhou, defendant Zhou gained unauthorized access to PHI after he was terminated 
by his hospital employer.319 For this, Zhou was charged with a misdemeanor 
violation of HIPAA.320 Zhou sought to have the criminal case dismissed by arguing 
that HIPAA criminal liability arises when a “person who knowingly and in violation 
of this part” of the HIPAA gained unauthorized access to PHI.321 Zhou did not 
argue that he had knowingly gained unauthorized access, but argued that a 
“defendant is guilty only if he knew that obtaining the personal healthcare 
information was illegal.”322 The Ninth Circuit responded by observing that: 
The word “and” unambiguously indicates that there are two elements of a 
Section 1320d-6(a)(2) violation: 1) knowingly obtaining individually 
identifiable health information relating to an individual; and 2) obtaining 
that information in violation of Title 42 United States Code Chapter 7, 
Subchapter XI, Part C. Thus, the term “knowingly” applies only to the act 
of obtaining the health information.323 
Accordingly, under HIPAA criminal liability is applicable if the defendant knew 
that he was accessing PHI without authorization.324 
Stepping back, the HITECH Act’s stimulus money was to encourage providers to 
adopt EMR systems and its amendment of HIPAA’s civil and criminal enforcement 
mechanisms are clearly intended to motivate CEs and BAs to provide the best e-
security they could afford. Whether healthcare providers can finance the conversion 
 316. DOJ Steps Up, supra note 315. 
 317. Atlanta Man Sentenced, supra note 315. 
 318. See supra note 315. 
 319. United States v. Zhou, 678 F.3d 1110, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 320. Id. at 1112 (the hospital’s culpability for failing to terminate Zhou’s computer access to PHI after he 
was terminated was not discussed). 
 321. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320d-6(a)) (emphasis added). 
 322. Id. at 1113.  
 323. Id.  
 324. Id. at 1115; see also Horne v. State, 445 N.E.2d 976, 979 (Ind. 1983) (a person “knowingly” commits an 
act if the act is a product of a conscious design, intent or plan), abrogated by Jackson v. State, 728 N.E.2d 147 
(Ind. 2000). 
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to a secure EMR system is an open question.325 Financial considerations will likely 
drive many healthcare providers to select the less secure cloud based EMR systems; 
thereby offering hackers the opportunity to exploit Internet holes and perpetuate 
MIT.326 And therein is the problem: nothing in the HITECH Act is specifically 
aimed at hackers.327 
The question then becomes does HITECH’s civil and criminal penalties 
combined create a deterrence for hackers? Perhaps. The economics of MIT mean 
that it is unlikely that HITECH’s CMP will deter a hacker.328 As we have seen, MIT is 
wildly profitable.329 If a hacker anticipates earning $20-30 million from MIT, the 
hacker is likely to view a fine of $3 million dollars as the price of doing business. 
Still, HITECH’s prescribed jail time for the unauthorized access of PHI might make 
a hacker think twice. Ten years in jail for perpetrating an e-security breach of an 
EMR system is a long time.330 
Still, while a ten-year jail term may cause a hacker to think twice, the deterrent 
value of jail time depends on the certainty it will be applied.331 Assume here that a 
hacker is an “other individual” within the meaning of the HITECH Act § 13409.332 
Under this statute: 
[A] person (including an employee or other individual) shall be considered 
to have obtained or disclosed individually identifiable health information in 
violation of this part if the information is maintained by a covered entity 
(as defined in the HIPAA privacy regulation[ )] . . . and the individual 
obtained or disclosed such information without authorization.333 
 325. Marla Durben Hirsh, Can Providers Afford the Changes Government Is Implementing? FIERCE EMR 
(Mar. 29, 2012), http://www.fierceemr.com/story/can-providers-afford-changes-government-implementing/ 
2012-03-29. 
 326. See supra Part II.A. 
 327. See generally 45 C.F.R § 160.103 (2011) (noting although HIPAA protects PHI, the scope of the Act’s 
Privacy Rule is limited to CEs and BAs). See also James G. Hodge, Assoc. Professor, Johns Hopkins Sch. of Pub. 
Health, Exec. Dir., Center for Law and the Public’s Health at Georgetown and Johns Hopkins University, The 
HIPAA Privacy Rule: Scope, Structure, and Implementation (Nov. 4, 2009), available at www.slidefinder.net/ 
t/the_hipaa_privacy_rule_scope/6645112. 
 328. See supra Table II and accompanying text. 
 329. See supra Table II and accompanying text. 
 330. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6(a) (2006 & Supp. IV 2011) (“[A] person (including an employee or other 
individual) shall be considered to have obtained or disclosed individually identifiable health information in 
violation of this part if the information is maintained by a covered entity . . . and the individual obtained or 
disclosed such information without authorization.”). 
 331. Raymond Paternoster, How Much Do We Really Know About Criminal Deterrence?, 100 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 765, 769–71, 821 (2010) (discussing different theories on criminal deterrence, their strengths and 
weaknesses, and the limits of deterrence theory in general). 
 332. HITECH Act § 13409, 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6(a) (2006 & Supp. IV 2011). 
 333. Id. (emphasis added). 
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Therefore, for hackers to be punished under § 13409, they must both hack into an 
EMR and obtain or disclose the information. 
Hackers are likely to understand the first element of § 13409. But what does it 
mean to obtain and disclose e-information? According to Black’s Law Dictionary, 
“to obtain” is “to get hold of by effort, to get possession of, to procure, to acquire in 
any way;” and “to disclose” is “to bring into view by uncovering, to expose, to make 
known, to lay bare, to reveal to knowledge, to free from secrecy or ignorance, or 
make known.”334 These are words grounded in the physical world; not cyberspace 
where holding a stream of electronic zeros and ones is a metaphysical concept. 
Interestingly, the cases reviewed for this Article failed to identify any hacker 
criminal cases where “to obtain” or “to disclose” were distinguished or used in a 
way different from their physical world meaning.335 
This suggests that certainty of a criminal conviction under the HITECH Act 
should be approximately the same as the certainty of a criminal conviction under 
other cybercrime statutes. Accordingly, to better understand the potential of jail 
time to deter hackers from gaining unauthorized access to PHI, a look at the ability 
of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) is appropriate.336 In 
addition, a review of the ECPA is appropriate here because, unless unauthorized 
access to PHI is obtained from the federal government’s EMR system, the ECPA is 
the only other federal statute for which a hacker could potentially be criminally 
tried.337 
B. ECPA 
The ECPA is composed principally of two parts: the Federal Wiretap Act (FWTA)338 
and Stored Communication Act (SCA).339 Historically, the FWTA is older. A 
rudimentary Wiretap Act340 was enacted in 1968 in response to the Supreme Court’s 
opinion in Katz v. United States.341 Technological advances soon required this first 
iteration of the Wiretap Act to be clarified.342 Accordingly, in 1986, the ECPA was 
passed, amending the 1968 Wiretap Act to produce the FWTA and creating the 
 334. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 320, 743 (6th ed. 1991). 
 335. See infra Part IV.B (discussing that under the EPCA, gaining unauthorized access to a computer that is 
privately owned, without more, does not trigger criminal liability). 
 336. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99–508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986).  
 337. See supra Part III.  
 338. See supra note 334. 
 339. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712 (2006 & Supp. IV 2011). 
 340. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Street Act of 1968, Pub. L. 90–351, 32 Stat. 197 (1968); see also 
Andrew R. Schulman, What Civil Practitioners Should Know about the Federal Wiretap and Stored 
Communications Acts, GETMAN, TAMPOSI, SCHULTHESS AND STEERE, P.A., http://www.andrewschulman.com/ 
Briefs/cle%20wiretap.PDF (discussing the origins of the Federal Wiretap Act). 
 341. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (extending Fourth Amendment protection to non-
consensual interceptions of private telephone conversations by the government). 
 342. Fraser v. Nationwide, 135 F. Supp. 2d 623, 633 (E.D. Pa. 2001). 
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SCA.343 Under the ECPA, the “amended Wiretap Act prohibits the unauthorized 
‘interception’ of oral, wire, and electronic communications, while the SCA 
prohibits “unauthorized ‘access’ to wire and electronic communications in 
temporary and back up storage.”344 Although both Acts have civil and criminal 
enforcement mechanisms345 and are often bundled together in ECPA, each Act is 
distinct and enforceable independent of the other.346 
1. FWTA 
A priori, the FWTA may appear to have limited application in the healthcare sector 
because its focus is on the privacy of communications and the punishment of e-
communication interception.347 But, this would not be correct because of 
telemedicine. Virtually every medical specialty has an analogue specialty in 
telemedicine.348 As the telemedicine market has matured, telecommunication 
vendors have similarly matured their attitude towards e-security. Prior to the 
enactment of the HITECH Act, one of us (TRM) interviewed a representative of 
Tandberg, a leader in telepresence technology (room-sized high-definition video 
conferencing).349 This representative disclosed that the company, at the time, did 
not encrypt its Video-over IP transmissions. In contrast, at the 2012 American 
Association of Thoracic Surgeons’ meeting, a representative of the In Touch Health 
Corporation found the concept of non-encryption of telemedicine imagery to be 
unimaginable in light of the HITECH Act.350 
Conceptually, telemedicine streamed over the Internet or sent via Video-over-IP 
could be intercepted thereby raising the potential of a wiretap. But for two practical 
reasons, the FWTA is unlikely to play a significant role in regulating the 
transmission of PHI or deterring hacker activity.351 First, intercepting PHI one 
record at a time is inefficient. Any hacker with the time or capital to invest in a 
telemedicine interception operation would be better served if that time and capital 
 343. See supra note 341. 
 344. Schulman, supra note 340. 
 345. 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2006 & Supp. IV 2011) (stating the civil and criminal penalties under the ECPA); id. 
§ 2701(b) (stating the criminal penalties under the SCA); id. § 2707 (stating the civil remedies under the SCA). 
 346. United States v. Councilman, 418 F.3d 67, 82 (1st Cir. 2005) (en banc). 
 347. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2510(15) (2006). 
 348. Thomas R. McLean, The Offshoring of American Medicine: Scope, Economic Issues and Legal Liabilities, 
14 ANNALS HEALTH L. 205, 228–46 (2005) (describing several different areas of the Healthcare Industry that 
have already begun using telemedicine to a significant degree and the potential for its use to spread).  
 349. Tandberg is now owned by Cisco Systems, Inc. See CISCO, http://www.cisco.com/en/US/ 
solutions/ns669/ttg.html (last visited Dec. 4, 2012). 
 350. Olivier Salat, Manager, International Markets, In Touch Health, in Santa Barbara, Cal. (In Touch 
Health streams its video through IP rather than over IP. For the discussion here these differences are not 
material, still the comparison of telemedicine products made here is not exactly apples to apples). 
 351. The same skill set that facilitates computer hacking also facilitates wiretapping. See GHOST, supra note 
22. 
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were directed at breaching the e-security of EMR system to gain access to a treasure 
trove of PHI. 
Second, transmission of e-data no longer occurs over a dedicated hardwire 
circuit that is susceptible to wiretapping. In the modern telecommunication world 
e-information is transmitted in packets.352 Packet switching according to the TCP/IP 
and other technologic innovations (including encryption and peer-to-peer 
networks) mean that electronic communications no longer travel in a linear fashion 
over a single wire.353 Rather e-communications are broken up into packets of 
information by the first Internet service provider’s (ISP) router that receives the 
document.354 Next, this router sends the packets to different routers according to an 
algorithm that is designed to maximize transmission speed but minimize Internet 
congestion.355 Not all packets go to the same intermediate routers.356 When the 
packets arrive at the destination router the e-message is then reassembled before it 
is sent on to the end user.357 
Packet switching’s non-linear transmission of e-messages makes hacker 
interception of e-messages very difficult.358 In the modern packet switching world, 
when e-messages are intercepted, the interception usually does not occur within the 
telephone system’s network, but rather when the e-message is transmitted over 
airways (i.e., when the e-message passes between a sender/receiver and a router via 
cellular telephony).359 Cellular telephony interception is relatively easy and can be 
achieved with a device that mimics a transmission tower.360 Conversely, the physical 
difficulties of intercepting a packet-wired e-message have caused one commentator 
 352. Paul Rosenzweig, The Evolution of Wiretapping, RED BRANCH (Aug. 3, 2011), 
http://www.redbranchconsulting.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=13:the-evolution-of-
wiretapping&catid=3:publications-and-presentaions&Itemid=7. 
 353. Id.; see also Third Generation Partnership Project Z: Packet Switched Video Telephony Services 
(PSVT/MCS) (June 2008), http://www.3gpp2.org/public_html/specs/C.S0055-A_v1.0_080623.pdf. 
 354. ISPs operate their own network of routers. Steven M. Bellovin, Wiretapping the Net, THE BRIDGE, 
Summer 2000, at 21, 22 (ISPs operate their own network of routers, but communicate with each other via 
private links and through public exchange points). 
 355. Id. 
 356. Id. 
 357. Id. at 24. 
 358. Paul Rosenzweig, The Evolution of Wiretapping, 12 ENGAGE: J. FEDERALIST SOC’Y PRAC. GROUPS 83 
(2011). On the other hand, if a telephone company or ISP cooperates “wiretapping” is still possible. Andy 
Greenberg, These Are the Prices AT&T, Verizon and Sprint Charge For Cellphone Wiretaps, FORBES (Apr. 3, 2012, 
3:01 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2012/04/03/these-are-the-prices-att-verizon-and-sprint-
charge-for-cellphone-wiretaps/. This is because packet switching produces e-copies of e-message that are stored 
on routers. See infra Part IV.A.1. However, such stored e-copies are better addressed under the SCA than the 
FWTA. See infra Part IV.A.1. 
 359. Kurt Marko, The Potential for Cell Phone Interception, 32 PROCESSOR 34 (2010), available at 
http://www.processor.com/editorial/article.asp?article=articles%2Fp3223%2F36p23%2F36p23.asp. 
 360. Dean Takahashi, Hacker Shows how He Can Intercept Cell Phone Calls with $1,500 Device, VENTUREBEAT 
(July 31, 2010, 1:31 PM), http://venturebeat.com/2010/07/31/hacker-shows-how-he-can-intercept-cell-phone-
calls-for-1500/ (noting an investment of $1,500 in equipment can provide access to approximately 80% of the 
global mobile communication system); see also Greenberg, supra note 358. 
 Thomas R. McLean & Alexander B. McLean 
Vol. 8, No. 1 2013 105 
to observe that “the laws and policies for authorized wiretapping have, effectively, 
become obsolete.”361 
In short, the reality of wiretapping in the 21st century and the inefficiency of 
stealing PHI one record at a time make it unlikely that hackers will make use of 
wiretaps. So the FWTA will not be discussed further here.362 
On the other hand, because packet switching results in e-messages363 being stored 
on routers, the SCA comes into play.364 Not only does the last router involved in an 
e-transmission make a copy of the message, so does the first router. Before sending 
the quantized message, the first router stores a copy of the e-message for reference 
in case a transmission error occurs.365 Similarly, when the quantized message is 
received at the destination router, a copy of the e-message is stored in case a 
transmission error occurs when the message is sent to the receiver.366 These e-copies, 
which are stored on an ISP’s routers, can be accessed by sophisticated hackers.367 
2. SCA 
The SCA is a federal statute that provides relief for victims of a hacker attack. Under 
the Act, unauthorized access to stored electronic communications is prohibited.368 A 
number of caveats, however, modify the scope of the SCA. First, authorization can 
be provided by a number of individuals besides the sender or receiver of an e-
message.369 Individuals who can grant authorization to access e-messages stored in 
an ISP’s system include: the electronic communication provider, the record user, 
and the government (for lawful purposes).370 Consent to access stored e-messages 
 361. Rosenzweig, supra note 358, at 84. 
 362. This is all the more reasonable because the incentives created by the FWTA are the same as those 
created by the SCA. 
 363. As an e-message and an e-copy of an e-message are physically indistinguishable, they will not be 
distinguished here. 
 364. The discussion of how the SCA regulates the government’s access to e-messages stored on ISP routers is 
to be contrasted to how Russia regulates such e-storage. All e-messages stored on Russian ISPs routers are 
forwarded to the FSB (the successor agency to the KGB). GLENNY, supra note 18, at 169–71. The FSB in turn 
reads everything and looks for encryption of e-messages, since encryption is a criminal act in Russia. Id. This 
fact explains why a substantial volume of identity theft is perpetrated by cyberscribes in Russia (and Eastern 
Europe). The FSB takes the position that only spies against the Russian State need encryption, but it could care 
less if a Russian cyberscribe commits an act that undermines the United States’ economic welfare. Id. 
 365. Rosenzweig, supra note 358, at 85. 
 366. Id. 
 367. STEVEN LEVY, IN THE PLEX: HOW GOOGLE THINKS, WORKS, AND SHAPES OUR LIVES 308–09 (2011). 
 368. 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a) (2006). 
 369. Id. § 2701(c). 
 370. Id. Law enforcement agencies at local, state, and federal level make use of this provision to conduct 
wireless e-surveillance operation. Cf. Andy Greenberg, These Are the Prices AT&T, Verizon and Sprint Charge for 
Cellphone Wiretaps, FORBES (Apr. 3, 2012, 3:01 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2012/04/03/ 
these-are-the-prices-att-verizon-and-sprint-charge-for-cellphone-wiretaps/. The procedures used and merits of 
such e-surveillance operations are beyond the scope of this Article. 
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can even be authorized inadvertently by third-parties.371 Second, under the SCA, the 
fact that a record custodian facilitated unauthorized record access does not bar 
recovery under the Act.372 So for example, a record custodian-owner was allowed to 
recover damages against a former employee for unauthorized access to his email 
account even though the record custodian-owner took months to disable the 
account.373 Finally, the SCA does not punish the subsequent use or disclosure of the 
unauthorized information obtained.374 
To have standing to bring an SCA action, the aggrieved party must show that the 
unauthorized access to the electronic documents was obtained with a “knowing or 
intentional state of mind.”375 Neither the statute nor case law precisely defines the 
meaning of “knowing.”376 Many courts, however, have taken the view that, within 
the context of the SCA, knowing is conduct that “includes willful blindness, but not 
recklessness or negligence;”377 and “a reckless defendant is one who merely knows of 
a substantial and unjustified risk of such wrongdoing.”378 A party with standing may 
file a lawsuit to seek recovery of actual damages or at a minimum $1000 of 
damages.379 Finally, under certain conditions, the SCA allows an aggrieved party to 
recover punitive damages and attorneys’ fees.380 
 371. In re DoubleClick, Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 500, 510–11 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). Without this 
case, behavioral advertising would have never developed to its current level and Professor Andrews would not 
have a best-selling book. See supra note 65. Today DoubleClick is owned by Google. LEVY, supra note 367, at 
330–36. 
 372. 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a) (prohibiting providers of electronic communication services from knowingly 
divulging the contents of stored e-documents). 
 373. Cardinal Health v. Adams, Case No 3:07:00691 (M.D. Tenn. 2008). See generally 18 U.S.C. § 
2702(a)(1)–(2). 
 374. Sherman & Co. v. Salton Maximum Housewares, 94 F. Supp. 2d 817, 820 (E.D. Mich. 2000); see also In 
re Am. Airlines Privacy Litig., 370 F. Supp. 2d 552, 558–59 (N.D. Tex. 2005). 
 375. 18 U.S.C. § 2707(a) (2006). 
 376. Worix v. MedAssets, Inc., No. 11 C 8088, 2012 WL 787210, at *2–3 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 8, 2012) (citing 
Freedman v. Am. Online, 329 F. Supp. 2d 745, 749 (E.D. Va. 2004)). But see id. at *3 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 647, 
99th Cong., 2d Sess. at 64 (1986)) (providing insight to the meaning of knowing in the SCA through its 
legislative history: “The term knowingly means that the defendant was aware of the nature of the conduct, 
aware of or possessing a firm belief in the existence of the requisite circumstances and an awareness of or a firm 
belief about the substantial certainty of the result . . . . The concept of ‘knowingly’ does not include, however, 
‘reckless’ or ‘negligent’ conduct”). 
 377. See, e.g., Worix, 2012 WL787210, at *3. 
 378. Id. at *4. The Worix court distinguished reckless conduct from willful blindness, which is conduct that 
“takes deliberate actions to avoid confirming a high probability of wrongdoing and who almost can be said to 
have actually known the critical facts.” Id. (citing Global-Tech Appliances v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2070–71 
(2011)). 
 379. 18 U.S.C. § 2707(c) (2006); see also Cedar Hill Ass’n. v. Paget, 2005 WL 3430562, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 9, 
2005). The ability to recover damages for use or dissemination of hacked electronic data arises under other 
theories of law (e.g., intellectual property or trade secret law), which are beyond the scope of this Article. 
 380. 18 U.S.C. § 2707(c) (2006). 
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Like “knowing,” a “violation” of the SCA is not defined.381 Some courts have 
taken the view that an SCA violation occurs each time a hacker gains unauthorized 
access to an e-document system,382 while other courts have the view that an SCA 
violation occurs each time a specific e-document is accessed.383 For civil litigation 
this distinction is of little importance, because an aggrieved party must prove their 
actual damages.384 However, under the criminal enforcement statute, a violation of 
the SCA carries a penalty of up to five years in prison per violation.385 So for a 
hacker who is caught and then criminally charged under the SCA, it makes a 
significant difference whether a violation occurs every time the record room is 
entered or whether a violation occurs every time a unique record is viewed. 
Yet, we could not find any cases where a hacker was criminally charged under 
the SCA for gaining unauthorized access to either a record room or a record.386 This 
is not an oversight on our part. Rather, it reflects how the SCA views temporary and 
permanent e-storage. 
Under the SCA electronic storage occurs when an e-communication is 
temporarily stored or archived on an ISP’s router.387 ISPs, therefore, provide two 
distinct services: electronic communication service (ECS) and remote computing 
service (RCS). ECS is “any service which provides to users thereof the ability to send 
or receive wire or electronic communications.”388 An ISP provides ECS when it 
actually transmits an e-communication; e-copies of e-communication generated 
during the transmissions are considered to be part of ECS.389 On the other hand, an 
ISP provides RCS when it provides “the public [with a] computer storage or 
processing services by means of an electronic communications system.”390 ISPs often 
archive e-communications that pass through their routers for “backup 
protection.”391 E-communications that have been archived by an ISP are not 
 381. Jeffery G. Weil & Robert A. Chu, Email Theft: What Are Your Damages, METRO. CORP. COUNSEL, Dec. 
2009, at 36, available at http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/articles/12001/email-theft-what-are-your-damages. 
 382. Cedar Hill Ass’n., 2005 WL 3430562 at *3; Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. U.S. Secret Serv., 36 F.3d 457, 
460 (5th Cir. 2009); see also Weil & Chu, supra note 381. 
 383. Van Alstyne v. Elec. Scriptorium, Ltd., 560 F.3d 199 (4th Cir. 2009); see also In re Hawaiian Airlines, 
355 B.R. 225 (D. Haw. 2006) (multiple logins are treated as if only one login had occurred); Weil & Chu, supra 
note 381.  
 384. 18 U.S.C. § 2707(c) (2006). 
 385. Id. § 2701(b). 
 386. Indeed, at issue in SCA criminal litigation is whether the government lawfully obtained access to 
electronic communications stored on an ISP’s servers. See United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 282 (6th Cir. 
2010). 
 387. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17) (2006). 
 388. Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a Legislator’s Guide to Amending It, 
72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1214 (2004) (citation omitted). 
 389. Id. at 1216. 
 390. Id. at 1214–16. 
 391. Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 984 (C.D. Cal. May 26, 2010). 
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necessarily in permanent storage.392 But, an ISP provides RCS when it allows its 
clients to access documents that are stored long term on its servers.393 
The distinction between the temporary ECS storage and the permanent storage 
of RCS matters. Under the SCA: 
It is not enough for the electronic communication data to have been 
accessed in any format on any computer, in order to run afoul of the SCA, 
the data must have been accessed or obtained while it was within the 
electronic storage of the electronic communications service itself.394 
Accordingly, once an e-communication has been archived and transferred into a 
permanent storage media, it is no longer covered under the scope of the SCA.395 
Now consider an EMR. When a healthcare provider enters data into an EMR 
system (or any computer), the e-document exists in Random Access Memory 
(RAM).396 One distinguishing characteristic of RAM is that it is volatile memory, 
meaning it loses all the content it is currently storing once the power is cut.397 (This 
is the reason word processing software prompts the user to save their work when 
the computer user attempts to close the program.) This volatile RAM storage 
corresponds to the temporary ECS. On the other hand, once the provider saves the 
data into a permanent storage medium (i.e., a hard drives or flash drive) the PHI 
continues to exist in the absence of electrical power.398 Permanent EMR storage 
corresponds with archived RCS storage. 
Accordingly, when hackers use their advanced knowledge to gain unauthorized 
access to an EMR system (e.g., when the Virginia State medical record system was 
hacked)399 access is gained to PHI in permanent RCS-type storage. This means that 
when hackers hack into EMR systems their conduct falls outside the scope of the 
SCA.400 More generally, the reason for paucity of SCA criminal prosecutions for 
hacking an EMR (or any computer) system is because the hackers only gain access 
 392. Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., Inc., 529 F.3d 892, 902–03 (9th Cir. 2008), rev’d City of Ontario, 
Cal. v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010). 
 393. Crispin, 717 F. Supp. 2d at 978. 
 394. Thompson v. Ross, 2:10-CV-479, 2010 WL 3896533, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2010). 
 395. Id. at *4. 
 396. Rene B. DeLaup, Inside the Personal Computer, 43 LA. B.J. 87, 88 (1995). 
 397. Id.  
 398. Id. 
 399. Brian Krebs & Anita Kumar, Hackers Want Millions For Data on Prescriptions; Theft of Va. Patient 
Records Claimed, WASH. POST, May 8, 2009, at B01. 
 400. This is because only temporary and backup storage are protected by the SCA. See Thompson v. Ross, 
2:10-CV-479, 2010 WL 3896533, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2010); see also United States v. Szymuszkiewicz, 622 
F.3d 701, 706 (7th Cir. 2010), as amended (Nov. 29, 2010); Baily v. Baily, No. 07-11672, 2008 WL 324156, at *6 
(E.D. Mich. Feb. 6, 2008); Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1075 (9th Cir. 2003). 
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to permanent e-records, and not the temporary ECS e-records that are covered by 
the SCA. 
The truth is that the SCA is not an anti-hacking statute. Rather, the “SCA 
regulates retrospective surveillance, specifically content that is in storage with an 
ISP.”401 As such: 
[T]he SCA imposes strict rules on when the government may compel 
service providers to disclose information they are storing on their 
subscribers. The SCA creates similar limits on voluntary disclosures to the 
government by ISPs in section 2702, heightening the protection provided by 
the private search doctrine of the Fourth Amendment. According to the 
United States Department of Justice, the SCA serves “to protect and regulate 
the privacy interests of network users with respect to government . . . and the 
world at large.”402 
President Obama’s administration is promoting anti-cybercrime legislation to 
combat increasing hacker activity in organized crime.403 The current administration 
has recently opined that “computers are now ‘a key tool of organized crime,’ with 
many hackers ‘tied to traditional Asian and Eastern European organized crime 
organizations.’”404 This statement was made after the cybercrime organization 
LulzSec broke into websites of the FBI, the CIA, and the Senate and the Obama 
administration was seeking to strengthen the penalties under the Computer Fraud 
and Abuse Act.405 Still, with an epidemic in PIT and likely coming epidemic of 
MIT,406 the Obama administration’s comments are equally true to private 
computers and EMRs. 
Erecting harsh penalties to deter scribes from using their specialized knowledge 
to further a criminal enterprise dates back to the earliest times of Ancient Egypt.407 
Unfortunately for healthcare providers, strengthening the criminal penalties under 
HITECH Act or the SCA, without more, is unlikely to deter hackers from hacking 
into private-sector EMR systems. Until an appropriate case is handed down, it is an 
open question whether the HITECH Act or the SCA covers hackers’ attacks on 
 401. Casey Perry, Recent Development, U.S. v. Warshak: Will Fourth Amendment Protection be Delivered to 
Your Inbox?, 12 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 345, 350 (2011). 
 402. Id. at 350–51 (citations omitted). 
 403. See generally Mathew J. Schwartz, Treat Hackers As Organized Criminals, Says Government, 
INFORMATIONWEEK (Sept. 9, 2011), http://www.informationweek.com/security/government/treat-hackers-as-
organized-criminals-say/231601078; Kenendra Srivastava, Obama Says Hacks Are Organized Crime, Wants 
Stiffer Penalties, MOBILEDIA (Sept. 9, 2011, 11:35 AM), http://www.mobiledia.com/news/107373.html. 
 404. Kenendra Srivastava, Obama Says Hacks Are Organized Crime, Wants Stiffer Penalties, MOBILEDIA (Sept. 
9, 2011, 11:35 AM), http://www.mobiledia.com/news/107373.html. 
 405. Id. 
 406. See supra Part III.  
 407. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.  
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EMRs.408 Nor, as the following hypothetical illustrates, is it likely that using the 
HITECH Act in tandem with the SCA’s civil enforcement mechanism will deter 
hacker activity. 
Suppose a healthcare provider’s EMR system is attacked by a hacker and one 
million individual EMRs are compromised. In this case, however, none of the 
patients whose PHI was compromised sustained any damages as the hacker’s 
momentary lack of focus resulted in him being arrested before the PHI could be 
auctioned off on the Internet. As direct consequence of having to publicly report 
the attack on its EMR system, the hospital ultimately sustains actual damages of $10 
million in the form of a loss of business due to its damaged reputation. The 
healthcare provider then brings an SCA civil action against the hacker to recover the 
$10 million in actual losses.409 Assuming that healthcare provider prevails in this 
litigation,410 the potential judgment for $10 million is unlikely to deter the hacker 
who can earn $50 million by selling medical identities.411 As the only unauthorized 
access to PHI occurred in a permanent storage media, the SCA’s criminal sanctions 
do not come into play.412 
C. Deterrence 
Nor is it likely that the HITECH Act’s criminal penalties will deter the hacker in this 
hypothetical. Even if a hacker is an “other individual” within the meaning of § 
13409,413 legal ambiguities (duration of sentences according to a per record room or 
a per record entered standard) and practical considerations of prosecuting 
cybercrime (the physical evidence that creates a nexus between the defendant and 
the crime) are likely to make convictions under the HITECH Act far from certain.414 
Recall that controversy exists under the SCA with respect to whether criminal 
liability turns on the number of times a record room is entered or on the number of 
records entered.415 Such controversy may develop under the HITECH Act. Under 
 408. We strongly believe, however, that courts will ultimately find that cyberscribes are “other individual[s]” 
within the meaning of the HITECH Act § 13409, unless our healthcare system evolves into one that has 
universal access. 
 409. Interestingly, SCA civil litigation does not often concern whether unauthorized access was obtained to 
e-documents in temporary or permanent storage. See, e.g., Van Alstyne v. Elec. Scriptorium, Ltd., 560 F.3d 199 
(4th Cir. 2009) (unauthorized access e-documents appear to have been in permanent storage); Konop v. 
Hawaiian Airlines, 302 F. 3d 868 (9th Cir. 2002) (same). 
 410. In this hypothetical, we also assume that because the cyberscribe is easily caught, he is locally based, 
and a court will have jurisdiction to hear the case. This is not necessarily true if our cyberscribe is sophisticated 
and working outside of the U.S. 
 411. See supra Table II. 
 412. See supra note 400. 
 413. Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act (HITECH Act) § 13409, 42 
U.S.C. § 1320d-6 (2006 & Supp. IV 2011). 
 414. See supra notes 305–18 and accompanying text; supra notes 381–383 and accompanying text; infra 
notes 431–33 and accompanying text.  
 415. See supra notes 380–84 and accompanying text. 
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the HITECH Act, a person who knowingly violates the Act by obtaining 
unauthorized access to PHI “relating to an individual” and acts with “intent to sell, 
transfer, or use individually identifiable health information for commercial 
advantage” may be “imprisoned not more than ten years.”416 The use of the term 
“an individual” suggests that when a court sentences a hacker for the unauthorized 
access of an EMR, the court should interpret HITECH’s punishment to be applied 
on a per record compromised basis. Yet, such a plain meaning interpretation is 
unlikely to stand. Consider the hacker(s) who stole 8 million medical records from 
the Commonwealth of Virginia.417 Now consider the outcome of a trial where the 
hacker was convicted of gaining unauthorized access to all 8 million records and the 
court used a per record entered standard for sentencing. Under these conditions the 
judge should hand down a sentence of 80 million years in prison. Such a judge 
would look foolish and the sentence would invite ridicule of the legal system. 
In addition, the HITECH Act also uses the language that unauthorized access to 
PHI is to be punished by “not more than 10 years” of imprisonment.418 In 
contemplating how to interpret this rule, courts might look to the structure of the 
HITECH Act’s CMP. Regardless of the tier used to assess a civil penalty, it is clear 
that the penalty to be applied is capped.419 For example, although the most severe 
penalty carries a fine of up to $50,000 per violation, this penalty is capped at $1.5 
million per year.420 Having made this observation, a court may conclude that it is 
reasonable to apply a similar interpretation of the statute to HITECH’s criminal 
penalties. So even if a court were to adopt a per record entered standard for 
criminal convictions, a hacker might only receive a ten-year sentence for 
compromising the PHI of millions of patients. 
Still, shouldn’t a ten-year prison sentence deter hackers from committing MIT? 
A priori, imprisonment is a weak deterrence. Of those individuals who are released 
from prison, 51.8% were back in jail within three years of release.421 This statistic 
suggests that prison is only an effective deterrence to one-third of the individuals 
 416. Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act (HITECH Act), 42 U.S.C. §§ 
1320d-6(a)–(b) (2006 & Supp. IV 2011). HITECH’s tiered criminal penalties punish non-commercial use of 
unauthorized PHI less severely than commercial use. Id. § 1320d-6(b).  
 417. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
 418. 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6(b)(3) (2006); see also Meridith Levinson, Why Law Enforcement Can’t Stop 
Hackers, COMPUTERWORLD UK (July 9, 2011, 5:01 PM), http://www.computerworlduk.com/advice/security/ 
3318744/why-law-enforcement-cant-stop-hackers/ (finding that “hackers rarely serve maximum sentences”).  
 419. Id. §§ 1320d-6(a)–(b) (2006 & Supp. IV 2011).  
 420. Id. 
 421. PATRICK A. LANGAN & DAVID J. LEVIN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, OFFICE OF JUST. PROGRAM, U.S. 
DEP’T. OF JUST., SPECIAL REPORT NCJ 193427, RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN 1994 (2002), available at 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/rpr94.pdf (finding that within three years of release, 51.8% of 
prisoners were back in prison, serving time for a new prison sentence or for a technical violation of their release, 
like failing a drug test, missing an appointment with their parole officer, or being arrested for a new crime). 
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who pass through a prison’s gates.422 Nor does criminal activity fall when a criminal 
becomes an adult and faces substantially longer jail time.423 Moreover, for 
cybercrime, jail time is a particularly weak deterrent because hackers realize “if they 
get caught, they might get five to 10 years, but when they get out, they’ll have a 
book deal, make a TV movie or become a consultant.”424 
More generally, whether imprisonment deters cyber criminals depends on the 
certainty and severity that a particular punishment will be imposed.425 Even if we 
assume a ten-year jail sentence strikes fear in the hearts of hackers, the deterrent 
value of jail time is substantially mitigated for hackers because they have to be 
caught and successfully prosecuted; neither of which are slam-dunk propositions.426 
The social engineering aspect of criminal hacking means that these individuals 
are skilled in the art of deception. Hackers believe that there is only “a small chance 
of getting arrested”427 because of their ability to disguise their identity428 and reside 
overseas,429 and because the resources needed to track down hackers are often 
limited.430 Once caught, the successful prosecution of a hacker depends on the 
demonstration that a tight nexus exists between the physical evidence and the 
alleged perpetrator.431 Such a nexus between the evidence and perpetrator can be 
difficult to demonstrate because merely having “thousands of credit-card details . . . 
 422. PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, STATE OF RECIDIVISM: THE REVOLVING DOOR OF AMERICA’S PRISONS 2, 9 
(2011), available at http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/sentencing_and_ 
corrections/State_Recidivism_Revolving_Door_America_Prisons%20.pdf (concluding that recidivism rates 
suggest that the prison system falls short in deterring future criminal behavior). 
 423. See Joel Waldfogel, The Irrational 18-Year-Old Criminal, SLATE (Jan. 30, 2007, 4:54 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/business/the_dismal_science/2007/01/the_irrational_18yearold_criminal.html 
(finding that while the probability of being sentenced rises from 3 to 17% at age 18, there is no significant 
measured decrease in the arrest rate). The study found that the only significance to turning 18 in terms of re-
arrest was that 18-year old offenders were slightly less likely to be re-arrested because they remained in prison 
for longer periods of time, serving on average longer sentences. Id. 
 424. Levinson, supra note 418 (finding that the deterrent effect for hackers is weakened by plea bargaining, 
reduced sentencing due to young age, or expectations of book deals, TV movie roles, or consulting jobs after 
release from prison); see Elinor Mills, Crime and Punishment: Harsh Fate for Accused, CNET NEWS (May 27, 
2012, 11:30 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1009_3-57417442-83/crime-and-punishment-harsh-fate-for-
accused-lulzsec-hackers/ (finding that hackers are unlikely to be deterred from cybercrime where they know 
that the anonymity of the Internet makes it is unlikely that they will be caught). 
 425. VALERIE WRIGHT, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, DETERRENCE IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE: EVALUATING 
CERTAINTY VS. SEVERITY OF PUNISHMENT 1–2 (2010); see also supra note 329 and accompanying text. 
 426. See supra note 425.  
 427. See Levinson, supra note at 418. 
 428. GLENNY, supra note 18 at 5–6, 94. 
 429. Leigh Goessl, The Problems Catching Hackers, Internet Security & Safety: Hacking, HELIUM (Feb. 4, 
2008), http://www.helium.com/items/840369-the-problems-with-catching-hackers.  
 430. Levinson, supra note 418 (“[L]aw enforcement officials lack the manpower, training, technical 
resources and political support necessary to crack down on these crimes.”). 
 431. See generally Deb Shinder, Preserving Digital Evidence to Bring Hackers and Attackers to Justice, 
COMPUTERWORLD (June 1, 2005), http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/print/102157/Preserving_Digital_ 
Evidence_to_Bring_Hackers_and_Attackers_to_Justice?taxonomyName=Security&taxonomyId=17. 
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sitting on your computer is not a crime, nor is storing a key-logger virus” a crime.432 
If the alleged perpetrator of a hack has used a VPN or a proxy server, which can 
render their detection “by law enforcement very hard, if not impossible,”433 
demonstrating a tight nexus similarly fails. 
Even after a tight nexus is established between the physical evidence of a 
cybercrime and a hacker defendant, the defendant may still avoid jail time if the 
case goes to the jury. The reason is that judges and juries are rarely fluent in cyber-
speak.434 If the triers of fact cannot follow the esoteric language of the cyberscribe, 
they are likely to develop doubts, which will undermine the prosecutor’s ability to 
secure a guilty verdict. 
The problem of understanding cyberscribe-speak is as old as the Egyptian 
pharaohs and arises any time a society is dependent on the literacy of a few of its 
members. So, if legal ambiguities, physical evidence considerations, and jury 
competence undermine our ability to use harsh penalties to deter hackers, how are 
we as a society to deter hackers from purloining PHI and committing MIT? The 
answer to this question does not require that we as a nation raise our computer 
science and code literacy level (as the Greeks and Roman might have suggested). 
Nor is an e-security arms race a solution. Former President Reagan 
demonstrated that a well-funded party could use an arms race to defeat an 
opponent.435 Imagining an arms race with hackers is not difficult. For example, 
HIPAA’s Security Rule could be amended to mandate that PKI encryption be used 
for all PHI and that the HITECH Act’s non-compliance penalties be made even 
harsher. But, given the money to be made trafficking in MIT, hackers would likely 
respond by ramping up their code breaking skills.436 Already, a Quantum computing 
algorithm exists to factor very large numbers into their prime number factors, 
thereby creating the specter that PKI encryption could be defeated.437 In addition, an 
e-security arms race is not in the United States’ best interest because it will drive up 
the cost of healthcare. To illustrate, PKI encryption requires greater computing 
power, which would mean that healthcare providers would have to purchase more 
expensive EMR systems.438 In turn, we as society would have to absorb the cost of 
more elaborate and more expensive EMR systems; a concept that would be 
anathema to both the HITECH Act and Affordable Care Act, which both seek to 
control healthcare costs. 
 432. See GLENNY, supra note 18 at 35. 
 433. GLENNY, supra note 18 at 94. 
 434. See DEBRA LITTLEJOHN SHINDER, SCENE OF THE CYBERCRIME COMPUTER FORENSICS HANDBOOK 36–37 
(Ed Tittel et al. eds., Syngress Publishing 2002), available at EBSCO eBook Collection. 
 435. See Lee Edwards, Ronald Reagan and the Fall of Communism, Lecture No. 1141 (Dec. 4, 2009), in 
HERITAGE LECTURES, Mar. 2010, at 3. 
 436. See supra notes 326–27 and accompanying text. 
 437. See Gleick, supra note 12, at 370–71. 
 438. See supra note 131 and accompanying text. 
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A better solution for protecting PHI and curtailing MIT is to change the 
economic incentives offered to hackers. More specifically, if we are interested in 
protecting PHI and eliminating MIT, we need to remove the obscene profits that 
arise from trafficking in PHI and medical insurance information.439 This could most 
easily be achieved by providing universal access to our healthcare system. 
Recall that three factors drive up the cost of MIT: (1) the need to link personal 
information with health insurance coverage information; (2) the purchase of 
temporary insurance coverage by un- and underinsured patients purchase from the 
black market; and (3) the institutional healthcare providers who leverage medical 
identities by filing multiple fraudulent reimbursement claims.440 Under a universal 
access to healthcare program, the first two factors would be negated: individuals’ 
personality identity would establish insurance coverage and universal access would 
destroy the need for a black market.441 
Arguably, provider healthcare fraud may even decrease in a healthcare system 
with universal access to patient care and a universal EMR system.442 Even before the 
HITECH Act was enacted, professional medical record custodians recommended 
that patient verification processes: 
[I]nclude obtaining and storing photo IDs or other means of identity 
verification or authentication if utilizing e-mail or Internet access. Make 
sure that the initial process is thorough, as determinations will be relied 
upon by subsequent users. The entire verification process and any data 
collected must be protected in accordance with the HIPAA security rule.443 
In the current era, where almost everyone has a cell phone that can receive email, 
it does not seem unreasonable to require insurers to verify with patients — in real 
time — that they are purchasing a healthcare service. After all, for more than twenty 
years health insurers have utilized pre-certification of healthcare services as a 
condition of coverage;444 and modern strategies for combating healthcare fraud 
eschew the “pay-and-chase” enforcement scheme.445 Prior verification that a patient 
 439. See Stanley C. Ball, Note, Ohio’s “Aggressive” Attack on Medical Identity Theft, 24 J.L. & HEALTH 111, 
120 (2011) (finding that the rise in medical identity theft can be attributed to the high black market value of 
medical information documents); see also supra Table II and accompanying text. 
 440. See supra Part III. 
 441. See supra notes 148–54 and accompanying text. 
 442. See supra notes 155–60 and accompanying text. 
 443. Chris Apgar et al., Mitigating Medical Identity Theft, 79 J. AHIMA 63, 66 (2008). 
 444. See COMMITTEE ON UTILIZATION MANAGEMENT BY THIRD PARTIES, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, 
CONTROLLING COSTS AND CHANGING PATIENT CARE?: THE ROLE OF UTILIZATION MANAGEMENT 14 (Bradford H. 
Gray & Marilyn J. Field, eds., 1989); see also Edward P. Richards & Thomas R. McLean, Physicians in Managed 
Care: A Multidimensional Analysis of New Trends in Liability and Business Risk, 18 J. LEGAL MED. 443, 447, 449 
(1997). 
 445. See Verizon Business, A New Approach to Combat Healthcare Fraud, SOLUTIONS BRIEFS (2011), 
http://www.verizonbusiness.com/resources/solutionbriefs/sb_new-approach-to-combat-healthcare-fraud_en_ 
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intended to purchase healthcare services would go a long way toward the 
elimination of the current lag time between the commission of MIT and its 
detection. 
The point here is not to open a comprehensive debate on universal access to 
healthcare in America. Rather, our point is that as long as MIT is wildly lucrative, it 
is extremely unlikely that harsh penalties or a technology arms race with hackers 
will motivate hackers to stop probing EMR e-security systems. Accordingly, if we 
are interested in protecting PHI and minimizing EMR e-security breaches, the most 
rational solution is to destroy the black market for PHI and insurance information. 
V. Conclusion 
In the healthcare field, the “mummy’s curse” is that we are allowing our medical 
record systems to be erected and guarded by a class of individuals who speak a 
foreign language. As a consequence, EMR e-security breaches and MIT are on the 
rise. We have attempted to combat these rising trends by enacting the HITECH Act 
to amplify HIPAA’s Privacy and Security Rules, as well as to magnify civil monetary 
penalties applied to healthcare providers who are non-compliant with these rules. 
Yet, from the point of view of the malicious cyberscribe, these legal changes are 
nothing more than cosmetic changes. Accordingly, the HITECH Act’s promise to 
reduce e-security breaches perpetrated by hackers (in search of a modern-day 
Aladdin’s cave of wonders), may be somewhat illusory. On the other hand, if we are 
genuinely serious about protecting patients’ privacy, a superior methodology to 
protecting PHI is to shift our healthcare system to one with universal access because 
a healthcare system with universal access would destroy the financial incentives 
associated with MIT.446 It would create an effective deterrence to the commission of 
this crime. 
xg.pdf (introducing a “new approach to healthcare fraud detection, [which] employ[s] integrated processes and 
a highly sophisticated data-reduction platform, capable of processing billions of transactions daily. . .[and] 
appl[ies] domain-specific predictive models, artificial intelligence algorithms and risk scoring to identify and 
prioritize abnormal patterns indicative of healthcare fraud” because “[t]he pay-and-chase approach to fraud 
remediation cannot compete with the omnipresent danger of an increasingly sophisticated criminal element”); 
see also Thomas R. McLean, Big Brother and the Need for a Performance Measure Integrity and Fraud Detection 
Act, LAW/TECH. J., 2d Quarter 2009, at 10–17 (arguing that metadata should be used to audit providers of 
EMRs). 
 446. See supra notes 144–60 and accompanying text. 
